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American Constitutional Law is an immense subject.  Some law schools cover the 
topic in one course, others in two or three; some cover it in the first year, others only in 
the second and third years, and still others teach some of it in the first year and then more 
in the final two years.  The subject is so large that most law schools also teach pieces of it 
in classes principally focused on Administrative Law, Criminal Procedure, Civil Procedure, 
Property, and many other topics.  
American legal publishers have produced scores of casebooks to fit this range of 
approaches.  It was thus with some trepidation that we decided to add our book to the mix. 
In the end, we concluded that we had a contribution to make, even to this rich market. 
There is, of course, something like a “canon” in constitutional law, which means that a 
book is unlikely to be distinctive for the cases that it chooses to cover; a constitutional 
law casebook would not be particularly useful, for example, if it did not include Marbury 
v. Madison, 5 U.S. (1 Cranch) 137 (1803), McCulloch v. Maryland, 17 U.S. (4 Wheat.) 316
(1819), Brown v. Board of Education of Topeka, 347 U.S. 483, 489 (1954), or many others. 
Instead, we think our book is distinctive—and thus will be especially effective in teaching 
the subject—for four principal reasons.
First, the book comes with an electronic version that students can access on their 
computers.  The electronic version contains live hyperlinks to cases, statutes, law review 
articles, and other materials available on Westlaw and other websites.  (Hyperlinked mate-
rial is indicated in the text of this book by underlining.)  Accordingly, students who wish to 
explore the material in greater depth have the tools at their fingertips to do so.  In addition, 
students who use laptop computers in the classroom will be able to view the course materi-
als on their computers in class.
Second, we have selected the principal cases very carefully, and we have tried to avoid 
the problem created by the aggressive editing in many books, which present excerpts so 
brief that the students in effect read only about what the Supreme Court has decided.  But 
Supreme Court opinions should be presented as more than a series of conclusory asser-
tions that have been stitched together by a space-sensitive editor.  We have tried to edit 
the principal cases to ensure that they are short enough to read, but rich enough to give 
the students a clear sense of the Court’s reasoning.  We have also chosen not to create the 
illusion of breadth that characterizes many books in the field.  Rather than provide sum-
maries of dozens of decisions in each area that we take up, we focus on fuller excerpts of 
the principal cases, which are designed to be illustrative.  Our book is self-consciously a 
casebook, and does not aspire to be a treatise.
Third, rather than follow the principal cases with pages and pages of notes and ques-
tions—an ineffective approach that students universally resent—we include multiple 
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sidebars in the excerpts of each principal case to focus the students’ attention on important 
questions at the very moment when they are reading the relevant portions of the opinion. 
Among other things, the sidebars focus attention on particularly salient passages of the 
opinions; draw connections between the discussion in the case and other topics that the 
students have explored (or will explore) in the book; supply food for thought; and direct 
the students to secondary materials to enrich their studies.  After each case, we provide 
brief points for discussion, to focus the students’ attention on the central themes in the 
case.  Each Chapter also contains hypothetical problems—often drawn from real cases—to 
encourage the students to apply the doctrine that they have learned, and ends with an 
“executive summary” of the material, to identify the main themes and doctrines covered 
in the Chapter.    
Fourth, throughout the book we include “Point-Counterpoints,” in which we provide 
arguments for and against central questions raised by the materials in the book.  To be sure, 
throughout the book—in the points for discussion and in short excerpts from scholarly 
articles by leading experts in the field—we present a diversity of views on every subject. 
But the Point-Counterpoint discussions are presented in our own voices and reflect our 
genuine points of disagreement on the many disputed questions raised in the book.  We 
think that the students will find these discussions rich and stimulating.
The first edition of the book covered decisions through the Supreme Court’s October 
2007 term, which ended in June 2008.  The second edition expanded the excerpts of 
many of the cases and included cases decided since 2008.  The third edition includes cases 
decided through the October 2013 term. The principal cases range from the old chestnuts 
to significant cases of much more recent vintage; from (to take just a few examples) Barron 
v. Baltimore, 32 U.S. (7 Pet.) 243 (1833), to McDonald v. City of Chicago, 561 U.S. 742
(2010); from Youngstown Sheet & Tube Co. v. Sawyer, 343 U.S. 579 (1952), to Hamdi v. 
Rumsfeld, 542 U.S. 507 (2004); from Dred Scott v. Sandford, 60 U.S. 393 (1857), to Parents 
Involved in Comm. Schools v. Seattle Sch. Dist. No. 1, 551 U.S. 701 (2007).  In addition, Part 
I, which provides background and an overview, ends with District of Columbia v. Heller, 554 
U.S. 570 (2008), the Second Amendment decision, as an illustrative case to foreshadow the 
themes that will recur in the rest of the book. 
Although we have attempted to provide fuller excerpts of the principal cases than 
is perhaps common in casebooks in the field, we of course nevertheless have had to do 
substantial editing.  We have used three asterisks to indicate that text has been omitted 
within a paragraph, although we have often omitted entire paragraphs without providing 
a similar indication.  (Because the cases are hyperlinked, students can easily read the full 
opinions, if they so choose.)  We have omitted most footnotes from the cases; when we 
have included them, we have used the original numbering from the cases.  Footnotes 
that we have inserted in the cases, on the other hand, are indicated by an asterisk and 
conclude with the notation “—Eds.”  We have also omitted many of the citations, but we 
have attempted to preserve the most important ones, which are also hyperlinked for the 
convenience of the students.  
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We wish to acknowledge the many people who have helped us to produce this book. 
Many people helped us with the first edition.  Our colleagues Tom Colby, Chip Lupu, 
and Robert Tuttle gave helpful suggestions, both for organization and content.  Jonathan 
Affleck, Julia Carrano, Bob Chen, Courtney Enlow, and Brad Sauer went above and beyond 
as research assistants, editing cases and offering insightful commentary.  Holly Saari did 
a terrific job making a dry manuscript come alive on the page.  Louis Higgins graciously 
invited us to write the book and provided constant guidance and aid in seeing it through 
to completion.  Dean Fred Lawrence and the George Washington University Law School 
also offered generous support. 
We had a similar embarrassment of riches with the second edition.  Brad Clark, Tom 
Colby, Chip Lupu, Jeff Powell, and David Stras gave us invaluable feedback on the first 
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Kyle Noonan, and Corrina Sowden provided outstanding research assistance.  And Megan 
Anderson and Holly Saari again transformed our messy mass of edits into a clean and 
attractive book.  We are grateful to our colleagues, at GW and elsewhere, for their thought-
ful suggestions for the third edition.  At the risk of inadvertently leaving some out, we wish 
to acknowledge Tom Colby, Ronald Collins, Elizabeth Joh, William Kelley, Chip Lupu, Alan 
Morrison, and Michael Rappaport for their helpful comments.
Gregory Maggs dedicates his contributions to the book to his patient family and to the 
many generations of law students at the George Washington University who have contrib-
uted to his understanding of constitutional law.  Peter Smith dedicates his contributions 
to the book to Eileen and David Smith and Laurie Sparling, who have always provided 
unconditional love and support, and to Jonah and Sarah, whose already highly refined 
sense of justice has consistently challenged his own. 
We hope that reading this book is as enjoyable for you as writing it was for us.
       
       GreGory e. MaGGs
       Peter J. sMith
March 2015
Washington, DC
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This book concerns the constitutional law of the United States.  As you will see in 
reading it, the book focuses mostly on how the Supreme Court has interpreted various 
provisions of the U.S. Constitution.  This introductory chapter provides some background 
for understanding the Court’s cases.  The chapter starts by describing the historical setting 
in which the Constitution came into being.  It then briefly outlines the structure and con-
tent of the Constitution.  Finally, it presents conflicting theories about how courts should 
interpret the Constitution.   
_______________
A.  Historical Setting of the 
Constitution
In the mid-1700s, the United Kingdom of 
Great Britain1 possessed a number of colonies 
in North America. Thirteen of these colonies 
later declared their independence and joined 
together to form the United States of America: 
Connecticut, Delaware, Georgia, Maryland, 
Massachusetts, New Hampshire, New Jersey, 
New York, North Carolina, Pennsylvania, 
1 “Great Britain” is the name of the large island that England, Scotland, and Wales occupy.  The Kingdom of 
England annexed Wales through Acts of Parliament passed in 1536 and 1543.  In 1707, the Act of Union merged 
the Kingdom of England and the Kingdom of Scotland to form a new nation called the “United Kingdom of Great 
Britain.”   Historical discussions often shorten the lengthy name of this nation to the “United Kingdom” or “Great 
Britain” or just “Britain.”
Many law students feel that they 
would benefit from a quick refresher 
on American history.  For a concise 
and easily accessible survey, visit the 
U.S. State Department’s “Outline of 
U.S. History,” available at http://pho-
tos.state.gov/libraries/amgov/30145/
publications-english/history_out-
line.pdf.  Chapters 3 and 4 of this 
outline, titled “The Road to Indepen-
dence” and “The Formation of a Na-
tional Government,” are especially 
relevant.  
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Rhode Island, South Carolina and Virginia.2  
What led these colonies to seek independence?  What did they hope to accomplish in 
forming a new nation?  How did they organize their government?  These are questions that 
anyone studying the Constitution must consider. 
1. Colonial Governance and Events Preceding the Revolution
The thirteen colonies that later formed the United States exercised a fair degree of 
self-governance for many years.  Each of the colonies had an elected assembly or legisla-
ture, which had authority to pass laws.  In addition, these assemblies generally had the sole 
power to impose taxes and the sole authority to set the budget.  The assemblies’ enactments 
were subject to disapproval by a governor (who was appointed by the King of England in 
all of the colonies except Connecticut and Rhode Island) and by an appointed legislative 
council (except in Pennsylvania).  But actual disapproval of legislation was very rare, and 
until the mid-1700s, few disputes arose between the colonies and the King or Parliament.
Serious challenges to the colonies’ self-governance did not come about until the end of 
the French and Indian War.  In this conflict, which lasted from 1754 until 1763, the United 
Kingdom fought against France and France’s American Indian allies in North America. 
Although the United Kingdom ultimately prevailed, it incurred enormous expenses in the 
process.  To help recover some of that money, Parliament passed several acts that sought to 
raise revenue from the colonies.  These acts included the Stamp Act of 1765 and Townsh-
end Act of 1767, both of which imposed taxes on various goods within the colonies.
Many colonists believed that these acts exceeded the power of Parliament.  They 
asserted that any taxation imposed on the colonists must come from their own assemblies. 
Some of the colonists consequently protested the legislation with petitions and civil disobe-
dience.  In 1770, to alleviate tensions, Parliament repealed the taxes on almost all goods. 
But Parliament retained a tax on tea, largely to demonstrate that it did have power to tax 
the colonies if it so chose.
Colonists responded to the remaining tax by boycotting British tea and by smuggling 
tea into the country without paying taxes on it.  (John Hancock, who later played a key 
role in the formation of the United States, was indicted on criminal charges for illegally 
purchasing and reselling tea from Holland.)  Parliament in turn passed the Tea Act of 1773, 
which allowed the English East India Company to import and sell tea at lower prices than 
what the colonial merchants were charging, with the hope of inducing Americans to stop 
their boycott of British tea.  To thwart this measure, on December 16, 1773, a group called 
the Sons of Liberty boarded ships in Boston Harbor that were carrying East India Company 
tea and threw the tea into the water.
2 In North America, the United Kingdom also possessed the colonies of Quebec, Nova Scotia, Prince Edward 
Island, East Florida, and West Florida, but these colonies did not seek independence at the time of the American 
Revolution.  Prior to the Revolution, the territory that later became Vermont was not recognized as a separate 
colony; instead, it was claimed by the colonies of both New York and New Hampshire.  Vermont declared its 
independence from Great Britain and from New York and New Hampshire in 1777, but did not participate in the 
government formed by the Articles of Confederation.  It joined the United States, after ratification of the Constitu-
tion, in 1791.  Massachusetts assumed control over Maine in the mid-1600s and retained that control until 1820. 
Maine accordingly did not sign the Declaration of Independence. 
The Intolerable Acts consisted of 
five individual acts.  The Boston 
Port Act closed Boston to commer-
cial shipping.  The Quartering Act 
allowed a governor to order that 
British soldiers be quartered in pri-
vate buildings if quarters were not 
provided for them within 24 hours 
following a request.  The Massachu-
setts Government Act gave the royal 
government the exclusive power to 
appoint judges and prosecutors and 
prohibited town meetings without 
the permission of the royal governor. 
The Administration of Justice Act al-
lowed the governor to order trials of 
persons arrested in Massachusetts to 
take place in other colonies, in or-
der to prevent magistrates and juries 
from acquitting local residents who 
were hostile to the governor.  The 
Quebec Act permitted the free exer-
cise of the Roman Catholic Religion 
in Quebec, but it also provided no 
elected legislative assembly, creat-
ing—as the other colonists saw it—a 
tyranny that might spread to the 
other colonies.
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In 1774, in response to this famous “Bos-
ton Tea Party,” Parliament passed five laws that 
the colonists called the “Intolerable Acts” or 
the “Coercive Acts.”  These acts, among other 
things, severely limited the civil and political 
rights of colonists in Massachusetts. The goal 
was to force the colonists to make restitution 
for the tea and generally cease their defiance of 
Parliament.  The founders of the United States 
remembered the loss of their liberty when they 
later drafted the Constitution and Bill of Rights.
2. The First and Second Continental 
Congresses
The Intolerable Acts and other factors led 
concerned colonists from all of the colonies 
except Georgia to send delegates to a meeting 
in Philadelphia.  The meeting became known 
as the “First Continental Congress.”  The del-
egates met peacefully between September 5 
and October 26, 1774.  In total, fifty delegates 
attended.  They included many famous figures 
of the era, such as John Adams, Samuel Adams, 
Patrick Henry, John Jay, Richard Henry Lee, 
Peyton Randolph, Roger Sherman, and George 
Washington.
The delegates to the First Continental Con-
gress did not act as if they had the power to pass 
laws or take any other governmental actions.  Instead, the delegates merely adopted resolu-
tions and submitted letters and petitions of grievances to the King.  Before adjourning, the 
First Continental Congress agreed to reconvene 
on May 10, 1775, in Philadelphia.
Before the appointed date for the Second 
Continental Congress arrived, war broke out 
in Massachusetts.  The fighting started with the 
battle of Lexington and Concord on April 19, 
1775.  In that battle, local militiamen defeated 
British troops who had come to seize their stores 
of weapons. Following the battle, colonists 
drove the British troops back to Boston and sur-
rounded the city.
It was in these circumstances that the Sec-
ond Continental Congress began to meet in Philadelphia on May 10, 1775.  The Congress 
included delegates from each of the thirteen colonies.  These delegates included many 
The records of the First and Second 
Continental Congress are collected 
and published in the Journals of the 
Continental Congress, 1774-1789 
(Worthington C. Ford et al. eds. 
1904-37), the full text of which is 
available at the Library of Congress’s 
website: http://memory.loc.gov/am-
mem/amlaw/lwjc.html.
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famous men of the founding era, such as John Hancock, John Adams, Benjamin Franklin, 
George Washington, and Thomas Jefferson.  Like the First Continental Congress, the Sec-
ond Continental Congress had no clear legislative authority.  It could adopt resolutions, but 
could not pass laws or impose taxes.  
Nevertheless, on June 15, 1775, the Second Continental Congress decided to assume 
authority over the American forces surrounding Boston, resolving that “a General be 
appointed to command all the continental forces, raised, or to be raised, for the defence of 
American liberty.”   It then unanimously selected George Washington for this position.  The 
Second Continental Congress also appointed additional subordinate officers, and it agreed 
to finance the military (although obtaining the funds for this purpose proved difficult). 
Over the course of the next eleven months, fighting between American and British forces 
continued.
By the summer of 1776, the war had convinced the colonists that the colonies could 
no longer remain a part of the United Kingdom.  Accordingly, on July 4, 1776, the Second 
Continental Congress adopted the Declaration of Independence.  With this declaration, 
the fighting with Great Britain became a war for independence.  The war for indepen-
dence—known now as the “Revolution” or “Revolutionary War”—lasted seven years.  The 
American forces lost most of the battles, but held together and eventually prevailed.  In 
1783, the United Kingdom acknowledged the independence of the United States in the 
Treaty of Paris, and the war ended.
3. The Articles of Confederation and the Calling of a Constitutional Convention
The Declaration of Independence proclaimed that the colonies had become “free and 
independent states.”  But these independent states needed to work together to prevail 
against the United Kingdom.  In 1777, while the Revolutionary War was still being fought, 
the Continental Congress drafted a document called the Articles of Confederation.  This 
document was finally approved by all of the states in 1781.
The Articles of Confederation was more like a multilateral treaty among allies than a 
formal constitution for a new national government.  The document announced that its 
purpose was to create a “firm league of friendship” among the former colonies, which had 
now become something more akin to separate states.  It emphasized that each “state retains 
its sovereignty, freedom, and independence.”  
Under the Articles of Confederation, the 
states would continue to send delegates to a 
Congress just as they had done before.  The 
Congress had limited power to pass laws, with 
each state having one vote.  But the government 
was not effective.  All measures required the 
unanimous assent of the states.  The Congress 
had no way to enforce laws or collect taxes. 
There were no national courts.  In addition, the 
unity of the states became strained over trade 
and other issues.
The newly independent states did 
not create a strong national govern-
ment in the Articles of Confedera-
tion.  Why might they have felt re-
luctant to do that even though the 
Revolutionary War clearly showed 
that the states needed to work to-
gether?
Food for Thought
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In 1787, the weaknesses in the Articles of Confederation led the Congress to call for a 
convention “for the sole and express purpose of revising the Articles of Confederation and 
reporting to Congress and the several legislatures such alterations and provisions therein as 
shall when agreed to in Congress and confirmed by the states render the federal constitu-
tion adequate to the exigencies of Government & the preservation of the Union.”  Notwith-
standing the Congress’s mandate, the convention quickly adopted as its task the drafting of 
a new Constitution. Accordingly, the convention became known as the “Constitutional 
Convention of 1787” (or sometimes the “Philadelphia Convention” or the “Federal Con-
vention”).
The states each could send as many 
“deputies” as they wanted to the Constitutional 
Convention.  At the Convention, however, the 
delegates decided that each state would have 
only one vote.  In total, fifty-five men attended 
the Convention.  These men represented all of 
the states except Rhode Island, which chose not 
to participate.  The deputies, whom we now 
call the “Framers” of the Constitution, included 
grand eminences such as George Washington 
and Benjamin Franklin; visionary political 
thinkers such as James Madison, Alexander 
Hamilton, James Wilson, and Roger Sherman; 
and masters of written expression such as Gou-
verneur Morris, who did most of the final sty-
listic editing of the Constitution.  The deputies 
also included dissenters, such as George Mason 
of Virginia, who refused to vote for the docu-
ment because it did not contain a bill of rights, 
and Robert Yates and John Lansing, Jr., who left 
the Convention early because they believed that 
their instructions from the New York legislature 
did not permit them to participate in creating a 
new constitution.
4. Proceedings of the Constitutional Convention
As the cases in this book will show, in interpreting the Constitution, the Supreme 
Court often looks very carefully at what the deputies argued and decided at the Constitu-
tional Convention.3  To understand the Court’s frequent references to the deputies’ debates, 
readers of the Court’s opinions should know what happened in Philadelphia.  Basically, the 
Convention took place in nine chronological segments:
1.  Full Convention (May 14 - May 29).  The Convention began by unanimously select-
ing George Washington to serve as the Convention’s president.  It then adopted rules gov-
3  As discussed in Part C of this Chapter, many writers disagree about whether it is possible to discern the original 
meaning of the Constitution from these debates and, in any event, whether the original meaning should govern 
modern interpretation of the Constitution. 
Although the Constitutional Con-
vention met in secret and the mem-
bers agreed not to discuss what took 
place, we now know a great deal 
about what transpired at the pro-
ceedings.  The Convention appoint-
ed a secretary, who kept an official 
journal.  In addition, at least eight 
of the fifty-five members took notes 
at the Convention.  By great fortune, 
James Madison, who was the intellec-
tual leader of the delegates, took the 
most extensive notes.  The records 
and notes are collected in The Records 
of the Federal Convention of 1787 (Max 
Farrand, ed., 1911), a source cited by 
more than 100 Supreme Court cases. 
The Library of Congress’s website 
contains the full text of this work: 
http://memory.loc.gov/ammem/am-
law/lwfr.html. For guidance in using 
these records, see Gregory E. Maggs, 
A Concise Guide to the Records of the 
Federal Constitutional Convention of 
1787 as Evidence of the Original Mean-
ing of the U.S. Constitution, 80 Geo. 
Wash. L. Rev. 1707 (2012).
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erning the proceedings.  These rules specified, among other things, that each state present 
and fully represented would have one vote and that the proceedings would be kept secret. 
On May 29, 1787, Edmund Randolph offered 15 resolutions, each just one sentence in 
length.  These resolutions—which became known as the “Virginia Plan” for government—
reflected the ideas of James Madison.  Under the plan, there would be a national legislature 
that would have two chambers, one directly elected and the other appointed by the state 
legislatures.  The plan generally favored the states with large populations (Massachusetts, 
Pennsylvania, New York, and Virginia) because it called for proportional representation in 
both houses.  After Randolph made this proposal, the Convention decided to deliberate as 
a committee of the whole (i.e., a gathering where all of the deputies could discuss the issues 
under informal rules of debate).
2. Committee of the Whole (May 30 - June 13).  On the first day when the deputies met 
as a committee of the whole, Gouverneur Morris urged Randolph to modify his resolu-
tions to include the following proposal: “Resolved, that a national government ought to be 
established consisting of a supreme Legislature, Executive, and Judiciary.”  The committee 
of the whole voted to adopt this resolution.  With this action, the committee of the whole 
implicitly endorsed creating a new Constitution as the goal of the Convention, rather than 
merely amending the Articles of Confederation.
3. Full Convention (June 13 - June 15).  The Convention formally debated the Virginia 
Plan from June 13 to June 15.  The small states opposed the Virginia Plan because they 
believed that their votes would be diluted in a national legislature with proportional repre-
sentation.  On June 15, William Paterson of New Jersey proposed a set of nine alternative 
resolutions, which became known as the “New Jersey Plan.”  The New Jersey Plan favored 
small states.  Most significantly, the plan called for a unicameral legislature with equal 
representation for each state.  The Convention again decided to meet as a committee of the 
whole, this time to discuss the New Jersey Plan.
4. Committee of the Whole (June 16 - June 19).  The committee of the whole debated and 
ultimately rejected the New Jersey Plan.  It also considered an alternative plan proposed by 
Alexander Hamilton.  Hamilton’s plan called for an executive elected for life and senators 
chosen for life.  The plan would have reduced state sovereignty by allowing the national 
executive to appoint executives for each state government.
5. Full Convention (June 19 - July 26).  Important debates about representation in the 
legislative branch followed the rejection of the New Jersey Plan.  The large and small states 
could not agree on the composition of the legislative branch.  Ultimately, a modified ver-
sion of the Virginia Plan became acceptable to the Convention after the delegates agreed to 
what has become known as the “Great Compromise” (or alternatively as the “Connecticut 
Compromise”).  In this compromise, the states would have equal representation in the Sen-
ate and proportional representation in the House.  This compromise balanced the interests 
of large and small states.  The Convention also adopted the closely related three-fifths rule, 
under which only three-fifths of a state’s slave population would be counted for determin-
ing representation in the House.  This feature split the difference between Southern states, 
which wanted all slaves counted for this purpose, and Northern states, which opposed 
counting any slaves in determining state entitlement to representation in the House.
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In addition to the Great Compromise, the Convention also addressed a variety of other 
important topics.  These included the term of the executive’s service, the appointment of 
judges, and the process for ratifying the Constitution.  On July 26th, with the general struc-
ture of the government settled, the Convention created a “Committee of Detail” to turn the 
plan into a draft.  The Convention recessed while the Committee of Detail performed its 
work.
6. Committee of Detail (July 27 - August 5).  John Rutledge, Edmund Randolph, and 
James Wilson did most of the work of the Committee of Detail.  In addition to describing 
the government and the selection of its members, the Committee of Detail added the list 
of congressional powers and the list of limitations on state powers now found in Article I. 
When the Committee of Detail finished, its draft was printed and distributed to all of the 
deputies.
7. Full Convention (August 6 - September 6).  The Full Convention then debated the Com-
mittee of Detail’s draft and other important matters.  They considered suffrage qualifica-
tions, immigration, slavery, and the veto power.  During this time, the Convention referred 
some matters to separate committees, which met and reported back to the Convention. 
After reaching final conclusions on most items, the Convention appointed a “Committee of 
Style” (sometimes called the “Committee on Style and Arrangement”).  The Committee of 
Style was charged with the task of putting the Constitution in a consistent form.
8. Committee of Style (September 6 - September 12).  The Committee of Style put all of 
the Convention’s changes into the draft and polished the text.  Gouverneur Morris did 
much of the work, although the Committee also included James Madison, William John-
son, Rufus King, and Alexander Hamilton.  Their work is seen as very important because 
they formulated the precise expression of many of the Constitution’s great clauses.  The 
Committee of Style finished its assignment on September 12, and a printer made copies of 
its draft for all of the deputies.
9. Full Convention (September 12 - September 17).  The Convention then debated the 
Committee of Style’s draft for several days.  During this time, George Mason and Elbridge 
Gerry proposed the inclusion of a bill of rights.  The Convention debated but rejected 
this proposal.  Two days later, on September 17, 1787, the state delegations present at 
the Convention unanimously approved the Constitution.   All of the individual delegates 
present except for Gerry, Mason, and Randolph signed the Constitution.  The Convention 
then adjourned.
5. Ratification of the Constitution
The Constitution, by its own terms, could not go into effect until ratified.  Article 
VII said:  “The Ratification of the Conventions of nine States, shall be sufficient for the 
Establishment of this Constitution between the States so ratifying the Same.”  Under this 
provision, each state legislature was expected to form a ratifying convention to debate and 
vote on the Constitution.  In the fall of 1787 and spring and early summer of 1788, the 
states held these ratifying conventions.
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Whether the proposed Constitution would be ratified was an open question.  The 
Constitution would make many substantial changes to the status quo.  Although some 
people favored ratification, many others did not.  Public debate spread throughout the 
states on the subject.   Supporters of the Constitution became known as the “Federalists,” 
while opponents became known as the “Anti-Federalists.”
Three of the best known Federalists were 
Alexander Hamilton, James Madison, and John 
Jay.  In the fall of 1787 and spring of 1788, they 
wrote a series of 85 essays explaining the Con-
stitution and urging its ratification in the State 
of New York.  Each of these essays was titled 
“The Federalist” followed by a number desig-
nating its order in the series.  Historians typi-
cally refer to the 85 essays as the “Federalist 
Papers.”  These essays, all of which are available 
online, address nearly every aspect of the Con-
stitution.  Although the essays are advocacy 
documents and not dispassionate legal analyses, 
they have been remarkably influential.  As you 
will see in reading the cases in this book, the 
Supreme Court regularly relies on these essays 
in attempting to discern the original meaning of 
the Constitution.
The Anti-Federalists opposed the Constitu-
tion for a number of reasons.  Two of the most 
important concerned the protection of state 
sovereignty and individual rights.  Opponents 
felt that the Constitution gave too much power 
to the federal government at the expense of the 
states.  They also worried that the Constitu-
tion did not contain a bill of rights that would 
limit the powers of the government.  In think-
ing about these opponents of the Constitution, 
modern readers should remember that their 
concerns stemmed from having lived through 
Parliament’s oppression of the colonies.
By the summer of 1788, conventions in 
nine states had approved the Constitution, put-
ting it into effect among the ratifying states.  As 
the following table indicates, ratification was 
uncontroversial in Delaware, New Jersey, and 
Georgia.  Each of these small states unanimously 
ratified the document.  
The Federalist Papers are clearly the 
most influential source of the origi-
nal meaning of the Constitution oth-
er than the text of the Constitution 
itself.  The Supreme Court has cited 
the Federalist Papers in more than 
400 cases.  The Library of Congress’s 
website contains the full text of the 
Federalist Papers: http://thomas.loc.
gov/home/histdox/fedpapers.html. 
For more information on the Feder-
alist Papers, see Gregory E. Maggs, A 
Concise Guide to the Federalist Papers 
as a Source of the Original Meaning of 
the United States Constitution, 87 B.U. 
L. Rev. 801 (2007).
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Many records from the state ratify-
ing conventions are collected in The 
Debates in the Several State Conven-
tions on the Adoption of the Federal 
Constitution, As Recommended by the 
General Convention at Philadelphia, in 
1787 (Jonathan Elliot, ed. 1836-59). 
This work, often called Elliot’s De-
bates for short, has been very influ-
ential; the Supreme Court has cited 
it in over 100 cases.  The full text 
is available online at the Library of 
Congress’s website: http://memory.
loc. gov/ ammem/amlaw/lwed.html. 
For guidance on using these records, 
see Gregory E. Maggs, A Concise 
Guide to the Records of the State Rati-
fying Conventions as a Source of the 
Original Meaning of the United States 
Constitution, 2009 U. Ill. L. Rev. 457.
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But the Constitution was much more controversial in other states.  Indeed, switching 
just a few votes in big states like New York or Virginia might have scuttled the entire proj-
ect. 
6. The First Congress
Federal elections took place during the fall of 1788, and the new government under 
the Constitution began in 1789.  George Washington, of course, became the first President. 
In the First Congress, which met from March 1789 to March 1791, a total of 29 persons 
served as senators and 66 served as representatives.  
Many of these senators and representatives 
justifiably could consider themselves experts on 
the Constitution.  Ten of the senators and eleven 
of the representatives had served as deputies at 
the Constitutional Convention.  Some of them, 
including James Madison, Oliver Ellsworth, and 
Roger Sherman, had played prominent roles in 
the Constitution’s drafting.  Other members of 
the First Congress, such as Richard Henry Lee, 
had participated at state ratifying conventions 
even though they had not attended the Consti-
tutional Convention.
State
Date of  
Ratification
Vote
Delaware Dec. 7, 1787 30-0
Pennsylvania Dec. 12, 1787 46-23
New Jersey Dec. 18, 1787 38-0
Georgia Jan. 2, 1788 26-0
Connecticut Jan. 9, 1788 128-40
Massachusetts Feb. 6, 1788 187-168
Maryland Apr. 28, 1788 63-11
South Carolina May 23, 1788 149-73
New Hampshire Jun. 21, 1788 57-47
Virginia Jun. 25, 1788 89-79
New York Jul. 26, 1788 30-27
North Carolina Nov. 21, 1789 195-77
Rhode Island May 29, 1790 34-32
Because the First Congress laid so 
much of the foundation for the 
new nation, the Supreme Court 
often looks to its acts for guidance 
in determining the original mean-
ing of the Constitution.  The acts 
of the First Congress are published 
in volume 1 of The Public Statutes at 
Large of the United States of America 
(1845), the citation of which is ab-
breviated as “1 Stat.”  The Library 
of Congress has the full text at its 
website: http:// memory.loc.gov/
ammem/ amlaw/  lwsl.html.
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During its two-year term, the First Congress passed an astounding 96 acts.  Among its 
many other accomplishments, the First Congress: 
• imposed taxes on imported goods and on vessels entering United States ports, pro-
viding the first source of federal revenue;
• shaped the executive branch by establishing the Departments of Foreign Affairs, 
War, and Treasury;
• created the federal judicial system;
• passed laws on naturalization, patents, copyrights, and other subjects still governed 
by federal law;
• established a system of lighthouses, the post office, and the Bank of the United 
States;
• provided for the assumption of state revolutionary war debts and paying of the 
national debt; and
• located the seat of government in the District of Columbia and admitted Kentucky 
and Vermont into the Union.
The First Congress also proposed twelve amendments to the Constitution, ten of which 
(now known as the Bill of Rights) received quick ratification by the states.  
_______________
B.  Organization of the Constitution
The Constitution contains a number of different parts.  No one expects a new student 
of constitutional law to commit the document to memory or to master its provisions in one 
reading.  But before going further, you should take some time to become familiar with its 
organization.
Preamble
The Constitution starts with an introduction, or “Preamble,” which lists the six goals 
of the People in adopting the Constitution: “to form a more perfect Union, establish Jus-
tice, insure domestic Tranquility, provide for the common defence, promote the general 
Welfare, and secure the Blessings of Liberty to ourselves and our Posterity.”  Although lofty 
in tone, the courts mostly have concluded that the language of the Preamble is precatory. 
In other words, it does not create legal rights, duties, or powers.  But the Preamble is still 
important.  For example, it makes clear that the “People” rather than the states adopted 
the Constitution.  We will consider this distinction in cases about the nature of the United 
States’ sovereignty.
Article I
Following the Preamble, the Constitution contains seven articles.  The first three arti-
cles reflect the Framers’ vision that there are three branches of government: the legislative 
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branch, the executive branch, and the judicial branch.  Each has its own powers and has 
some ability to provide checks on the others.  But as we will see in Chapter 6, sometimes 
questions arise about whether one branch is attempting to exercise powers belonging to 
another branch.
Article I contains ten sections that address the legislative branch.  Section 1 establishes 
the fundamental point that “[a]ll legislative Powers herein granted shall be vested in a Con-
gress of the United States, which shall consist of a Senate and House of Representatives.” 
This means, among other things, that Congress has these powers, and that the President 
and the courts do not. You will read about this provision in famous cases like Youngstown 
Sheet & Tube v. Sawyer, 343 U.S. 579 (1952), in which the Court held that the President 
was unconstitutionally attempting to assert powers that were legislative in nature.
Sections 2 through 6 then tell how senators and representatives are selected, what their 
qualifications must be, how they are paid, and so forth.  These provisions come up in the 
important case of U.S. Term Limits v. Thornton, 514 U.S. 779 (1995), a case invalidating an 
attempt to add what amounted to additional restrictions on who could run for the House 
or Senate.
Section 7 describes the procedure that Congress must follow in order to pass a law.  As 
most high school civics classes teach, the House and Senate have to approve a bill, and the 
President must sign it.  If the President vetoes a bill (i.e., rejects it), the House and Senate 
can override the veto with a two-thirds vote.  But we will see in INS v. Chadha, 462 U.S. 
919 (1983), that Congress has sometimes been tempted to look for ways to exercise power 
without involving the President.
Section 8 then lists the subjects upon which Congress may pass laws.  It says that Con-
gress may collect taxes, regulate commerce, establish a post office, and so forth.  Chapter 
3 of this book covers what Congress may and may not do under Article I, section 8.  We 
will see in Heart of Atlanta Motel v. United States, 379 U.S. 241 (1964), and Katzenbach v. 
McClung, 379 U.S. 294 (1964), that Congress has the power to pass legislation protecting 
civil rights.  On the other hand, we will see in United States v. Lopez, 514 U.S. 549 (1995), 
and New York v. United States, 505 U.S. 144 (1992), that the Supreme Court has struck 
down laws attempting to ban guns from schools or order the states to provide for the 
disposal of radioactive waste as being beyond the power of Congress to enact.
Sections 9 and 10 state various specific prohibitions.  Section 9 says that Congress 
generally cannot suspend the writ of habeas corpus, pass ex post facto laws, tax exports 
from states, or give preference to one state’s ports.  Section 10 then tells us some of the 
things that the states may not do.  They cannot enter treaties or coin money, impose duties 
on imports and exports, and so forth.
Article II
Article II concerns the executive branch.  The Chief Executive, of course, is the Presi-
dent of the United States.  Article II, section 1 says:  “The executive Power shall be vested 
in a President of the United States of America.”  But the President does not act alone.  The 
federal departments and agencies assist the President.  The Constitution does not create 
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these departments, but in various provisions it contemplates their existence.  Congress has 
created many such departments, including the Department of Justice, the Department of 
Defense, the State Department, and so forth.
The President is the chief executive.  In general, that makes everyone else in the execu-
tive branch subordinate to the President.   The President generally exercises control by 
firing or threatening to fire those who will not carry out his lawful policies.   But we will 
see in cases like Humphrey’s Executor v. United States, 295 U.S. 602 (1935), and Morrison 
v. Olson, 487 U.S. 654 (1988), that Congress may place some limits on the ability of the 
President to control subordinates in this manner.
Section 2 puts the President in charge of the military, and allows him to grant pardons 
and appoint judges and other office holders.  Section 3 requires the President to report 
to Congress, receive ambassadors, make sure that the laws are faithfully executed, and so 
forth.
Article III 
Article III describes the power of the federal judiciary.  The first sentence of Section 
1 tells us that “[t]he judicial Power of the United States, shall be vested in one supreme 
Court, and in such inferior Courts as the Congress may from time to time ordain and 
establish.”  Section 2 then tells about the subject matter jurisdiction of federal courts.  For 
example, it says that they can hear lawsuits between “Citizens of different States,” which we 
know as diversity jurisdiction.  We will see in the first case included in Chapter 2, Marbury 
v. Madison, 5 U.S. (1 Cranch) 137 (1803), that the Court struck down a federal statute that 
attempted to give the Court jurisdiction beyond the limits of Article III, section 2.
Articles IV - VII
Articles IV through VII contain a variety of different provisions.  Article IV generally 
addresses relations among the states.  As we will see in Chapter 4, the Privileges and 
Immunities Clause in Article IV limits discrimination by states against citizens of other 
states.  Article V discusses the amendment process.  The House and Senate can propose 
amendments by a two-thirds vote or two-thirds of the states can call a convention.  (The 
latter route for amendment has never been used.)  Proposals for amending the Constitution 
become effective when three-fourths of the states have ratified them in their legislatures 
or in conventions.  Article VI tells us, among other things, that the “Constitution, and the 
Laws of the United States *** shall be the supreme Law of the Land.”  Article VII describes 
the ratification process that had to occur before the Constitution could take effect.
Amendments
The Constitution now contains 27 amendments.  The first 10 amendments, com-
monly called the Bill of Rights, protect a large number of individual rights.  Amendments 
13 through 15 are known as the “Civil War Era Amendments” or the “Reconstruction 
Amendments” because they were passed at the end of the Civil War during the process of 
Reconstruction.  They abolish slavery, bar states from denying equal protection of the laws 
or due process of the law to any person, and protect voting rights.  We will be looking 
13C hapter 1 History and Overview
extensively at the First Amendment’s protection of Free Speech, Free Press, and Religion, 
and at the Fourteenth Amendment’s guarantees of Equal Protection and Due Process, in the 
second half of this book.
_______________
C.  Methods of Interpreting the Constitution
One of the many things that distinguished the American Constitution at the time 
of its ratification was the simple fact that it was written down.  (Although the United 
Kingdom—the nation from which the United States broke but from which it inherited its 
legal tradition—also had a “constitution,” it was developed over time, in a common-law 
fashion, rather than codified.)  At first blush, one might expect there to be little need for a 
thick casebook of judicial opinions for matters governed by a written document.  But the 
study of American constitutional law has, from the very beginning, been as much a study 
of judicial interpretations of the Constitution as it has been of the document itself.  We will 
see one of the reasons why this is so in Chapter 2 when we consider Marbury v. Madison 
and the topic of judicial review.  But answering the question of who should get to interpret 
the Constitution—a question on which there is substantial continuing debate, as we will 
see in Chapter 2—does not tell us why a written Constitution should so frequently require 
interpretation in the first place.  As it turns out, there has long been a need for interpreta-
tion of the Constitution because it is often not obvious, even after careful consultation of 
the text of the Constitution, what the Constitution tells us about important questions.
There are several reasons why this is so.  First, the Framers of the Constitution (and 
those who ratified it) sought to preserve some degree of flexibility for subsequent genera-
tions to address pressing problems and, if necessary, to structure the government accord-
ingly.  Second, as described above, although the Framers were able to achieve consensus by 
compromising on some controversial questions, they masked their disagreement on other 
questions by writing general and vague provisions.  Third, the Framers simply did not 
anticipate some of the questions that would arise in the future.  Today’s problems often look 
very different from the problems of 1789—or 1868, when the Fourteenth Amendment was 
ratified.  Accordingly, the plain text of the Constitution often does not speak directly to 
questions that are likely to arise today.
One possible response to constitutional silence would be to conclude that if the Con-
stitution does not expressly prohibit a particular action, it permits it.  The Constitution, 
after all, is almost entirely about the limits on governmental, rather than private, action—
the sole (and obviously incredibly important) exception being the Thirteenth Amendment, 
which prohibits slavery—and one could sensibly conclude that if the Constitution does not 
prohibit the government from taking a certain action, it implicitly permits it.  There is great 
appeal to this approach; indeed, as we will see, among other things, it attempts to preserve 
democratic government by preventing judicial interference with the modern choices of 
democratically elected officials.  But even if one is persuaded that it is the proper response 
to constitutional silence, it does not help us to determine when in fact the Constitution is 
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silent on a particular question.  This is because the Constitution’s broad provisions arguably 
touch on a wide range of topics, even though they fail to provide specific guidance on most 
controversial questions that are likely to arise. 
Indeed, the Constitution tends to speak at very high levels of generality.  There is little 
doubt, for example, that the First Amendment protects the freedom of speech, but it does 
not define “freedom” or “speech.”  Is a contribution to a candidate for public office a form 
of “speech”?  See Buckley v. Valeo, 424 U.S. 1 (1976), which we will consider in Chapter 
14.  What about publicly burning a draft card as a form of protest against an ongoing war? 
See United States v. O’Brien, 391 U.S. 367 (1968), which we will also consider in Chapter 
14.  And even if we can agree on what counts as speech, does a law imposing some limits 
on the ability to engage in a particular form of speech—but not prohibiting it entirely—
“abridg[e]” the “freedom” protected by the Amendment?  Similarly, the Fourteenth Amend-
ment prohibits the States from denying to persons the “equal protection of the laws,” but it 
does not give any more guidance about what those terms mean—whether, for example, the 
government is ever permitted to distinguish among citizens and, if so, whether some bases 
for classification are more problematic than others; and, if so, whether a State can justify a 
particular suspect classification—such as a requirement that drivers over 70 years old, but 
not younger drivers, get annual eye exams, or a ban on women serving in combat in the 
military—with sufficiently compelling reasons.  Even determining whether the Constitu-
tion is “silent,” therefore, requires interpretation of the document’s broad terms.  
Of course, the Constitution is not unusual among written texts in requiring interpreta-
tion to determine its meaning.  Courts routinely are called upon, for example, to interpret 
statutes and contracts, written texts that only sometimes speak with great detail, and often 
speak in broad generalities—or, with respect to issues that are litigated, are entirely silent. 
Although interpretation of such documents is commonplace, there are a range of interpre-
tive approaches that courts follow—and substantial debate over which are appropriate and 
defensible.  In the context of statutory interpre-
tation, for example, there are lively debates over 
whether judges should consider legislative his-
tory to determine statutory meaning, or whether 
courts should seek to discern congressional 
purposes in order to shed light on how Con-
gress would have chosen to address particular 
circumstances about which the statute is silent. 
Similarly, there is a long-standing debate over 
whether, in interpreting a contract, courts 
should consider only the plain meaning of the 
contract’s terms or instead may consider extrin-
sic evidence to determine a contract’s meaning. 
But even assuming that there is a “correct” way to interpret statutes and contracts, 
matters are at least arguably more complex when the document at issue is the Constitution, 
because the Constitution is quite different from a statute or a contract in many important 
ways.  First, as we will see when we consider Marbury v. Madison in Chapter 2, the Consti-
There is an extensive literature on 
the appropriate way for courts to 
interpret statutes.  For a taste of the 
debate, compare John F. Manning, 
Textualism as a Nondelegation Doc-
trine, 97 Colum. L. Rev. 673 (1997), 
with Alexander Alienikoff, Updating 
Statutory Interpretation, 87 Mich. L. 
Rev. 20, 47-61 (1988).
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tution is understood to be a form of “higher” law—that is, it cannot be superseded by an 
ordinary statute enacted by Congress, and (by its own express terms, in the Supremacy 
Clause of Article VI) it trumps state law that is inconsistent with its provisions.  Second, by 
its own terms (in Article V), the Constitution can be amended only after obtaining a super-
majority consensus—a two-thirds majority in both Houses of Congress and ratification by 
three-quarters of the States—that has rarely been achieved in over two hundred years.  As 
noted above, there have been only 27 Amendments, and even that number tends to over-
state the ease with which the Constitution may be amended: the ten Amendments in the 
Bill of Rights were adopted together two years after ratification of the original document, 
and one other (the Twenty-Seventh) was proposed along with the original Bill of Rights; 
three Amendments were adopted within only a few years after the Civil War; and two of the 
Amendments—the Eighteenth, enshrining Prohibition, and the Twenty-First, repealing 
it—effectively cancel each other out.  Indeed, not only is it difficult to amend the Constitu-
tion, but Article V actually states that some of its provisions cannot be amended at all, even 
with the requisite support of two-thirds of both Houses of Congress and three-fourths of 
the states.  Perhaps more strikingly, the provision that cannot be amended today is the one 
that gives each state an equal voice in the Senate, even though that provision arguably is 
the single most anti-democratic provision in the Constitution itself.  Third, and particu-
larly important in light of the first two distinctive features, the Constitution is over 200 
years old.  
Together, these features of the Constitu-
tion—its status as higher law, the difficulty of 
amending it, and its age—stand in uneasy ten-
sion with the notion of democracy.  Indeed, the 
very notion of constitutionalism means that 
democratically elected majorities today cannot 
decide to govern themselves in the manner of 
their choosing if their choices would conflict 
with the Constitution.  This tension is generally 
known as the “dead-hand problem”: to embrace 
constitutionalism is to accept that the men who 
wrote and ratified the Constitution to govern 
them over 200 years ago should also be able 
to reach into the future, with their now-dead 
hands, and tell us how to live our lives.  
One possible response to the dead-hand 
problem, of course, would be to deny the con-
tinuing binding force of the Constitution.  It is, after all, merely a collection of words with 
no independent force beyond our willingness to follow it.  But this response historically 
has held little appeal, because each successive generation has seen great value in binding 
itself to a charter for self-governance. First, it would be difficult for government to function 
without rules for the proper exercise of its power. Second, there is good reason to limit the 
power of democratic majorities. The Constitution is a form of self-imposed paternalism, to 
prevent us from letting the perceived exigencies of the moment lead us to decisions that, 
The provision in the Constitution 
providing the requirements for its 
ratification itself was inconsistent 
with the “constitution” that was in 
force at the time it was adopted.  Al-
though Article VII provided that the 
Constitution would become effective 
upon ratification by nine of the thir-
teen states, the Articles of Confeder-
ation expressly required unanimous 
consent of the states for any amend-
ments to its terms.  What does this 
suggest about the extent to which we 
should treat the current Constitution 
as binding?
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upon reflection and with the clarity of hindsight, we know are destructive of our most 
deeply held values.  
And, as explained above, if we are to embrace the Constitution, then we must have 
some way to interpret it.  The debate over how to interpret the Constitution is at least 
as old as the Constitution itself and tends to reflect the basic tension created by the very 
notion of constitutionalism.  On the one hand, if we accept that the Constitution is a form 
of law (albeit higher law), then there is a strong argument that we should interpret it as we 
would any other law—to have a generally fixed content, determined by the will of those 
who enacted it, embodied either in their intentions, in the text itself, or in the understand-
ing of that text at the time it was enacted.  Indeed, one could forcefully argue that if 
the Constitution did not mean what its Framers thought it meant—or at least something 
closely approximating, at some level of generality, what they thought it meant—then the 
Constitution would not truly be a form of law in any conventional sense.  This conception 
of the proper way to interpret the Constitution forms the theoretical basis of the approach 
to interpretation known as “originalism.”  Proponents of originalism argue that a provision 
of the Constitution must mean today what it meant, or perhaps was understood to mean, 
when it was ratified. 
On the other hand, if we are concerned about the dead-hand problem and its seeming 
inconsistency with our democratic impulses today, then we might seek to interpret the 
Constitution in a way that reflects values that have enduring support, and not simply those 
that were important at the time of the Founding.  According to this view, if the Constitution 
is binding principally because we agree to be bound by it, and we are eager to be bound 
by it only if we perceive it to be legitimate according to contemporary values, then we 
must update the Constitution in order to preserve it.  This conception of the proper way to 
interpret the Constitution is often called “non-originalism,” defined in contrast to what it is 
not.  Most non-originalists rely to some degree on the original meaning of the Constitution, 
at least at a high level of generality, but also see room for constitutional meaning to evolve. 
The debate over these competing views reflects the fundamental paradox of constitu-
tionalism: if the Constitution is a form of law, then its meaning to the people who adopted 
it must be central to its meaning today.  But do those people have a right to bind us to 
their choices?  In the sections that follow, we consider the conventional arguments for and 
against originalism and non-originalism.  
1.  Originalism
Originalism is an approach to interpretation that accords dispositive weight to the 
original meaning of the Constitution. According to this approach, a provision of the Con-
stitution must mean today what it meant when it was adopted.  Under an originalist 
approach, for example, if the Constitution did not prohibit capital punishment in 1789—
or in 1791, when the Bill of Rights was ratified, or in 1868, when the Fourteenth Amend-
ment was ratified—then it does not prohibit it today.  Conversely, under an originalist 
approach, if the Constitution in 1789—or, again, in 1791 or 1868—did not authorize 
Congress to rely on its authority under the Commerce Clause to regulate certain matters, 
Some originalists seek the original 
“intent” of the Framers, some seek 
the original “understanding” of the 
Constitution by the Framers or the 
ratifiers, and still others seek the 
original “objective meaning” of the 
Constitution.  What are the differ-
ences among those three concepts? 
Should judges apply different inqui-
ries depending upon whether they 
seek original intent, understanding, 
or objective meaning?  
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then arguably Congress lacks that power today, 
as well.  (We will consider in Chapter 3 whether 
changes in the nature of “commerce” inevitably 
should lead to the conclusion that Congress has 
greater power to regulate local matters today 
than it did at the time of the Framing.)    
Proponents of originalism generally offer 
five principal arguments in support of their 
approach to interpreting the Constitution. 
First, they argue that to interpret is, by defini-
tion, to seek the original meaning of the text. 
Second, they argue that originalism is the only 
approach to constitutional interpretation that 
properly recognizes the Constitution’s status as 
law.  Third, they argue that originalism is necessary to preserve democratic values.  Fourth, 
they argue that originalism is uniquely promising for constraining the ability of judges to 
impose their own personal views under the guise of constitutional interpretation. Fifth, 
deciding constitutional issues in accordance with the original meaning of the Constitution 
is a methodology firmly established by precedent.  We discuss these claims in turn.  
First, originalists argue that to interpret a document is, by definition, to attempt to 
determine what its author or authors intended to convey.  When we interpret a contract—
or read a shopping list or any other written text, for that matter—we generally seek to 
determine what the author of the document meant, at the time that the author wrote it.  It 
should be no different, originalists contend, when we seek to interpret the Constitution.
Second, originalists generally argue that because we have always treated written law 
as having a fixed meaning—this is true, for example, for statutes, whose meaning does not 
generally evolve over time—the Constitution, which is a form of law, must have a fixed 
meaning, as well.  And, originalists argue, just as a statute’s meaning is determined by 
reference to the understandings of the people who enacted it, the meaning of a provision of 
the Constitution must also be determined by reference to the people who were responsible 
for its enactment.  Originalists do not necessarily deny the existence of the dead-hand 
problem, but they argue that if the Constitution is authoritative only to the extent that we 
agree with it today, then it is not really law at all but instead is simply a makeweight.  
Third, proponents of originalism argue that only their approach is consistent with 
the proper judicial role in a democratic society.  Any approach other than originalism, 
they argue, inevitably seeks constitutional meaning in evolving or current values.  But 
a democratic system, they argue, does not need constitutional guarantees to ensure that 
its laws reflect current values.  And it is fundamentally anti-democratic, they contend, to 
permit unelected judges to invalidate democratically enacted laws that are not inconsistent 
with the original meaning of the Constitution.  
Fourth, originalists contend that because judicial review is by its very nature counter-
majoritarian—a theme that we will explore in detail in Chapter 2—it is essential to ensure 
upon reflection and with the clarity of hindsight, we know are destructive of our most 
deeply held values.  
And, as explained above, if we are to embrace the Constitution, then we must have 
some way to interpret it.  The debate over how to interpret the Constitution is at least 
as old as the Constitution itself and tends to reflect the basic tension created by the very 
notion of constitutionalism.  On the one hand, if we accept that the Constitution is a form 
of law (albeit higher law), then there is a strong argument that we should interpret it as we 
would any other law—to have a generally fixed content, determined by the will of those 
who enacted it, embodied either in their intentions, in the text itself, or in the understand-
ing of that text at the time it was enacted.  Indeed, one could forcefully argue that if 
the Constitution did not mean what its Framers thought it meant—or at least something 
closely approximating, at some level of generality, what they thought it meant—then the 
Constitution would not truly be a form of law in any conventional sense.  This conception 
of the proper way to interpret the Constitution forms the theoretical basis of the approach 
to interpretation known as “originalism.”  Proponents of originalism argue that a provision 
of the Constitution must mean today what it meant, or perhaps was understood to mean, 
when it was ratified. 
On the other hand, if we are concerned about the dead-hand problem and its seeming 
inconsistency with our democratic impulses today, then we might seek to interpret the 
Constitution in a way that reflects values that have enduring support, and not simply those 
that were important at the time of the Founding.  According to this view, if the Constitution 
is binding principally because we agree to be bound by it, and we are eager to be bound 
by it only if we perceive it to be legitimate according to contemporary values, then we 
must update the Constitution in order to preserve it.  This conception of the proper way to 
interpret the Constitution is often called “non-originalism,” defined in contrast to what it is 
not.  Most non-originalists rely to some degree on the original meaning of the Constitution, 
at least at a high level of generality, but also see room for constitutional meaning to evolve. 
The debate over these competing views reflects the fundamental paradox of constitu-
tionalism: if the Constitution is a form of law, then its meaning to the people who adopted 
it must be central to its meaning today.  But do those people have a right to bind us to 
their choices?  In the sections that follow, we consider the conventional arguments for and 
against originalism and non-originalism.  
1.  Originalism
Originalism is an approach to interpretation that accords dispositive weight to the 
original meaning of the Constitution. According to this approach, a provision of the Con-
stitution must mean today what it meant when it was adopted.  Under an originalist 
approach, for example, if the Constitution did not prohibit capital punishment in 1789—
or in 1791, when the Bill of Rights was ratified, or in 1868, when the Fourteenth Amend-
ment was ratified—then it does not prohibit it today.  Conversely, under an originalist 
approach, if the Constitution in 1789—or, again, in 1791 or 1868—did not authorize 
Congress to rely on its authority under the Commerce Clause to regulate certain matters, 
Some originalists seek the original 
“intent” of the Framers, some seek 
the original “understanding” of the 
Constitution by the Framers or the 
ratifiers, and still others seek the 
original “objective meaning” of the 
Constitution.  What are the differ-
ences among those three concepts? 
Should judges apply different inqui-
ries depending upon whether they 
seek original intent, understanding, 
or objective meaning?  
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that judges employing it exercise, in Alexander Hamilton’s words, “judgment” rather than 
“will,” The Federalist No. 78—that is, that judges simply interpret the law rather than make 
the law.  Because the original meaning of the Constitution is fixed, originalists argue, it can 
be objectively determined by a judge without reference to his own political preferences.  In 
contrast, they argue, if the Constitution’s meaning “evolves,” but derives from something 
other than democratic enactments, then the judges seeking the Constitution’s meaning will 
not be restrained in their ability to impose their own personal views under the guise of 
constitutional interpretation.     
Fifth, deciding constitutional issues in accordance with the original meaning of the 
Constitution is a methodology firmly established by precedent from the 1790s to modern 
times.  Indeed, all members of the Supreme Court today, whether they might be character-
ized as liberal or conservative, routinely justify their constitutional decisions, in whole 
or in part, by asserting that they are following the original meaning.  Look for evidence 
of this practice as you read the cases in this book.  In contrast, instances in which the 
Supreme Court expressly has rejected originalist methodology are extremely rare.  To be 
sure, sometimes there are disagreements about what the original meaning of the Constitu-
tion was.  But in these instances the Justices are usually disagreeing about conclusions and 
not about methods.  Accordingly, even if other, non-originalist, interpretative methods 
might be legitimate or even preferable in some ways, originalists contend that respect for 
precedent should cause judges to hesitate to abandon a methodology so firmly rooted in 
the Supreme Court’s decisions.
The basic approach of originalism, of course, is not a new approach to interpretation. 
But it has attracted renewed attention and support in the last few decades, in part as a 
response to the perceived non-originalism of the Supreme Court in the 1950s, 1960s, and 
1970s, an era that saw a substantial judicial expansion of rights subject to constitutional 
protection.  
Perspective and Analysis
Justice Antonin Scalia has arguably been the most well-known and influential 
originalist.  Consider his defense of the approach:
[O]riginalism seems to me more compatible with the nature and purpose of a Con-
stitution in a democratic system.  A democratic society does not, by and large, need 
constitutional guarantees to insure that its laws will reflect “current values.”  Elections 
take care of that quite well.  The purpose of constitutional guarantees *** is precisely 
to prevent the law from reflecting certain changes in original values that the society 
adopting the Constitution thinks fundamentally undesirable.  
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2.  Non-Originalism
In contrast, non-originalists generally believe that the Constitution’s meaning today 
is not always the meaning that it had when it was ratified.  Non-originalists accordingly 
look to a range of sources in interpreting the Constitution.  This is not to say that all non-
originalists believe that the original meaning is irrelevant to constitutional interpretation; 
to the contrary, virtually all theories of constitutional interpretation accord significant—
and in some cases dispositive—weight to the original meaning.  Non-originalists often 
conclude that the original meaning of a constitutional provision, expressed at a very high 
level of generality, provides guidance for ascertaining the relevant constitutional rule.  Non-
originalists, for example, might read the Equal Protection Clause of the Fourteenth Amend-
ment to announce a general rule about equal treatment, which they might be willing to 
apply in a manner that the Framers of the Fourteenth Amendment did not contemplate, 
such as to discrimination on the basis of gender.  But, for the reasons discussed below, 
non-originalists sometimes are willing to depart from the original meaning.  
Non-originalists also often look to judicial precedent in seeking constitutional mean-
ing.  In this way, many non-originalists view constitutional interpretation as something 
akin to common-law decision-making, with constitutional principles evolving gradually 
over time.  Non-originalists also often look to 
state practices to determine whether broad con-
sensus has developed that a particular action or 
practice is acceptable or unacceptable.  For 
example, if public flogging is banned in all states 
but one—and has been illegal in all states but 
one for decades—then a non-originalist might 
conclude that public flogging today is a “cruel 
and unusual” punishment within the meaning 
of the Eighth Amendment, even though it likely 
He has also criticized the alternatives to originalism:
[T]he central practical defect of nonoriginalism is fundamental and irreparable: the 
impossibility of achieving any consensus on what, precisely, is to replace original 
meaning, once that is abandoned.  ***  [In contrast, originalism] establishes a his-
torical criterion that is conceptually quite separate from the preferences of the judge 
himself. 
Antonin Scalia, Originalism: The Lesser Evil, 57 U. Cin. L. Rev. 849, 862-64 
(1989).
As we will see in Chapter 7, the Su-
preme Court has held that the Due 
Process Clause of the Fourteenth 
Amendment “incorporated” most of 
the provisions in the Bill of Rights, 
applying their limits to state, as well 
as federal, action.
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was not thought to be cruel and unusual in 1791, when the Eighth Amendment was rati-
fied, or in 1868, when the Fourteenth Amendment was ratified.
Non-originalists are willing to depart from the original meaning of the Constitution 
because of concerns about originalism itself.  Non-originalists have generally disputed 
originalists’ claims that originalism is likely to produce determinate constitutional meaning 
today.  More fundamentally, non-originalists argue that departure from the original mean-
ing often is necessary to ensure that the Constitution retains legitimacy, which is essential if 
the public is to continue to accept the Constitution’s binding character.   We discuss these 
claims in turn.
First, non-originalists contend that most difficult constitutional questions that arise 
today cannot be answered by simple reference to the original understanding.  They observe 
that the historical record is silent on many important provisions of the Constitution; that 
when the Framers did discuss the meaning of a particular provision of the Constitution, 
they often disagreed about its meaning; and that, in any event, the Framers did not con-
template, let alone discuss, most of the difficult questions that arise today or how the 
Constitution would apply to those problems.  Accordingly, non-originalists argue that 
resort to the original meaning is unlikely to produce determinate constitutional meaning 
today.  Non-originalists also argue that this likely indeterminism undermines the claim that 
originalism is uniquely promising as a way to constrain judges from imposing their own 
views under the guise of constitutional interpretation; faced with an ambiguous or indeter-
minate historical record, non-originalists contend, judges have discretion to choose the 
evidence of original meaning that best reflects their own personal values.  
Second, and more important, non-original-
ists argue that originalism fails to account for the 
dead-hand problem, and thus risks producing a 
Constitution that fails the test of legitimacy.  Orig-
inalism, non-originalists note, by definition gives 
voice to the values of the framing generation, and 
thus risks producing results that the American 
public today might find problematic.  An origi-
nalist approach to the Fourteenth Amendment, 
for example, arguably would have required the 
Court to conclude, contrary to the decision in 
Brown v. Board of Education, 347 U.S. 483 (1954), 
that racial segregation in public schools does not 
violate the Equal Protection Clause.  Similarly, 
discrimination on the basis of gender was com-
monplace in 1868 when the Fourteenth Amend-
ment was ratified; a faithfully originalist approach 
almost certainly would permit the states today to 
prohibit women from (among other things) serv-
ing as lawyers, as they did at the time that the 
Amendment was ratified.  See Bradwell v. Illinois, 
83 U.S. (16 Wall.) 130 (1873). 
There is a debate among scholars 
about whether Brown was correct 
as an originalist matter.  Compare 
Robert H. Bork, The Tempting of 
America 76 (1990), and Michael W. 
McConnell, Originalism and the De-
segregation Decisions, 81 Va. L. Rev. 
947 (1995) (arguing that Brown was 
consistent with the original under-
standing of the Fourteenth Amend-
ment), with Alexander Bickel, The 
Original Understanding and the Seg-
regation Decision, 69 Harv. L. Rev. 
1 (1955), and Michael Klarman, 
Brown, Originalism, and Constitution-
al Theory, 81 Va. L. Rev. 1881 (1995) 
(arguing that Brown was inconsistent 
with the original understanding of 
the Fourteenth Amendment). We 
will consider the decision in Brown, 
and discrimination on the basis of 
race and gender, in Chapter 11.
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Non-originalists recognize that the Constitution (in Article V) makes explicit provision 
for the adoption of amendments, but they argue that the potential of the amendment process 
to incorporate modern values into the Constitution is illusory.  In 1954, for example, when 
the Court decided Brown, Southern resistance would have prevented the ratification of an 
amendment prohibiting racial segregation.  Similarly, as recently as the 1970s, a proposed 
amendment to prohibit discrimination on the basis of gender failed to achieve ratification 
in the required three-quarters of the States.  These results, non-originalists contend, would 
substantially undermine respect for the Constitution, and thus the public’s willingness to 
be bound by the Constitution.  Perhaps as a result, many of the Court’s decisions cannot be 
explained simply by reference to the original meaning of the Constitution, and some of the 
Court’s decisions are almost certainly inconsistent with the original meaning.
_______________
_______________
All of this discussion leads to an important question:  Which interpretive method does 
the Supreme Court use?  As you will see, this question has no simple answer.   As you read 
the Court’s cases, you will find three categories of decisions.
Perspective and Analysis
Justice William Brennan was an influential critic of originalism and a propo-
nent of what some call “Living Constitutionalism.”  Consider his view:
A position that upholds constitutional claims only if they were within the specific 
contemplation of the Framers in effect establishes a presumption of resolving textual 
ambiguities against the claim of constitutional right.  ***  This is a choice no less po-
litical than any other; it expresses antipathy to claims of the minority to rights against 
the majority.  ***  
Justice Brennan did not reject the notion that the Constitution has enduring 
principles, defined by the Framers’ choices.  But he disagreed with a formulaic 
application of those principles:
Current Justices read the Constitution in the only way that we can: as twentieth-
century Americans.  We look to the history of the time of the framing and to the 
intervening history of interpretation.  But the ultimate question must be: What do 
the words of the text mean in our time?  For the genius of the Constitution rests not 
in any static meaning it might have had in a world that is dead and gone, but in the 
adaptability of its great principles to cope with current problems and current needs.  
William J. Brennan, Jr., The Constitution of the United States: Contemporary 
Ratification, 27 S. Tex. L. Rev. 433, 436 (1986).
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In some cases, especially older ones, the Supreme Court has insisted emphatically that 
only the original meaning of the Constitution matters.  The decision in South Carolina v. 
United States, 199 U.S. 437 (1905), made this point with unmistakable clarity.  The Court 
said:  “The Constitution is a written instrument.  As such its meaning does not alter.  That 
which it meant when adopted, it means now.” Id. at 448.
In other cases, however, the Court has squarely rejected the idea that it must follow 
the original meaning of the Constitution.  For example, in Home Building & Loan Assn. v. 
Blaisdell, 290 U.S. 398 (1934), which we will consider in Chapter 18, the Court allowed 
a state law to alter the obligation of a mortgage contract even though it recognized that 
this result likely conflicted with the original understanding of Contracts Clause in Article 
I, Section 10.  The Court unapologetically rejected the idea that “the great clauses of the 
Constitution must be confined to the interpretation which the framers, with the conditions 
and outlook of their time, would have placed upon them.”  Id. at 443.
Most modern cases fall somewhere in between these two extremes.  Usually, the Court 
considers evidence of the original meaning without making broad pronouncements about 
whether the original meaning must control.  Sometimes the Court follows the original 
meaning, and sometimes it does not.  Interestingly, even though the current Justices have 
very different views on constitutional interpretation, they all cite the Federalist Papers, the 
records of the Constitutional Convention, and the state ratifying debates from time to time 
because they all consider these sources to be influential.  In many cases, the Court tries to 
follow the original meaning, but simply cannot agree on what it was.  For example, as we 
will see in Chapter 4 in U.S. Term Limits, Inc. v. Thornton, 514 U.S. 779 (1995), both the 
majority and dissenting opinions claim to follow the original meaning.
In reading the cases in this book, consider not only the results that the Supreme Court 
reaches, but also what interpretive methodology the Court is using.
_______________
This section has provided an overview of the competing approaches to constitutional 
interpretation.  Although we directly address the arguments for originalism and non-
originalism here, in many respects all of the material that follows in this book speaks, even 
if only indirectly, to the same question.  Indeed, the judicial decisions in this book about 
what the Constitution means often are as much about the appropriate way to interpret the 
Constitution as they are about the meaning of the particular provisions at issue.  As you 
read those materials, be sensitive to the relationship between arguments about the meaning 
of particular provisions of the Constitution and arguments about the appropriate way to 
interpret the Constitution more generally.
_______________
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D. An Illustrative Case
As we have discussed, constitutional interpretation often involves the need to ascribe 
concrete meaning to ambiguous text and the need to apply that text to concrete circum-
stances.  What considerations are relevant in engaging in those inquiries?  
In the case that follows, the Court considered the constitutionality under the Second 
Amendment of the District of Columbia’s prohibition on the possession of handguns in 
the home.  As you read the three opinions in the case—one for the Court and two in dis-
sent—consider the roles that text, history, structure, and policy play in the interpretations 
that the Justices advanced.  
_______________
District of Columbia v. Heller
554 U.S. 570 (2008)
Justice SCALIA delivered the opinion of the Court.
The District of Columbia generally prohibits the possession of handguns.  It is a 
crime to carry an unregistered firearm, and the registration of handguns is prohibited.  See 
D.C.Code §§ 7-2501.01(12), 7-2502.01(a), 7-2502.02(a)(4) (2001).  Wholly apart from 
that prohibition, no person may carry a handgun without a license, but the chief of police 
may issue licenses for 1-year periods.  See §§ 22-4504(a), 22-4506.  District of Columbia 
law also requires residents to keep their lawfully owned firearms, such as registered long 
guns, “unloaded and dissembled or bound by a trigger lock or similar device” unless they 
are located in a place of business or are being used for lawful recreational activities.  See 
§ 7-2507.02. 
[Respondent Dick Heller, a D.C. special police officer authorized to carry a handgun 
while on duty at the Federal Judicial Center, wished to keep a handgun at home.  He filed a 
lawsuit in District Court challenging these provisions under the Second Amendment.  The 
District Court dismissed respondent’s complaint, but the Court of Appeals directed the 
District Court to enter summary judgment for respondent.]
The Second Amendment provides: “A well regulated Militia, being necessary to the 
security of a free State, the right of the people to keep and bear Arms, shall not be infringed.” 
***  The two sides in this case have set out very different interpretations of the Amend-
ment.  Petitioners and today’s dissenting Justices believe that it protects only the right to 
possess and carry a firearm in connection with militia service.  Respondent argues that it 
protects an individual right to possess a firearm unconnected with service in a militia, and 
to use that arm for traditionally lawful purposes, such as self-defense within the home. 
The Second Amendment is naturally divided into two parts: its prefatory clause and its 
operative clause.  ***  Logic demands that there be a link between the stated purpose and 
the command.  [That] requirement of logical connection may cause a prefatory clause to 
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resolve an ambiguity in the operative clause ***.  But apart from that clarifying function, 
a prefatory clause does not limit or expand the scope of the operative clause.  Therefore, 
while we will begin our textual analysis with the operative clause, we will return to the 
prefatory clause to ensure that our reading of the operative clause is consistent with the 
announced purpose.  
Operative Clause
“Right of the People.”  The first salient feature of the operative clause is that it codifies 
a “right of the people.”  The unamended Constitution and the Bill of Rights use the phrase 
“right of the people” two other times, in the First Amendment’s Assembly-and-Petition 
Clause and in the Fourth Amendment’s Search-and-Seizure Clause.  The Ninth Amend-
ment uses very similar terminology ***.  All three of these instances unambiguously refer 
to individual rights, not “collective” rights, or rights that may be exercised only through 
participation in some corporate body.  ***  What is more, in all [other] provisions of the 
Constitution that mention “the people,” the term unambiguously refers to all members of 
the political community, not an unspecified subset. [This] contrasts markedly with the 
phrase “the militia” in the prefatory clause.  As we will describe below, the “militia” in 
colonial America consisted of a subset of “the people”—those who were male, able bodied, 
and within a certain age range.  Reading the Second Amendment as protecting only the 
right to “keep and bear Arms” in an organized militia therefore fits poorly with the opera-
tive clause’s description of the holder of that right as “the people.”  We start therefore with 
a strong presumption that the Second Amendment right is exercised individually and 
belongs to all Americans.
“Keep and bear Arms.”  We move now 
from the holder of the right—“the people”—to 
the substance of the right: “to keep and bear 
Arms.”  Before addressing the verbs “keep” 
and “bear,” we interpret their object: “Arms.” 
The 18th-century meaning is no different 
from the meaning today.  The 1773 edition of 
Samuel Johnson’s dictionary defined “arms” as 
“weapons of offence, or armour of defence.”  1 
Dictionary of the English Language 107 (4th 
ed.) (hereinafter Johnson).  ***  The term was 
applied, then as now, to weapons that were not 
specifically designed for military use and were 
not employed in a military capacity. 
We turn to the phrases “keep arms” and “bear arms.”  Johnson defined “keep” as, most 
relevantly, “[t]o retain; not to lose,” and “[t]o have in custody.”  Johnson 1095.  ***  Thus, 
the most natural reading of “keep Arms” in the Second Amendment is to “have weapons.”
At the time of the founding, as now, to “bear” meant to “carry.”  When used with 
“arms,” however, the term has a meaning that refers to carrying for a particular purpose—
confrontation.  ***  Although the phrase implies that the carrying of the weapon is for the 
You will see throughout this book 
that opinions often cite 18th-centu-
ry dictionaries as evidence of what 
words in the Constitution meant at 
the time of the Framing.  For guid-
ance on this practice, see Gregory 
E. Maggs, A Concise Guide to Using 
Dictionaries from the Founding Era to 
Determine the Original Meaning of the 
Constitution, 82 Geo. Wash. L. Rev. 
358 (2014). 
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purpose of “offensive or defensive action,” it in no way connotes participation in a struc-
tured military organization.  From our review of 
founding-era sources, we conclude that this 
natural meaning was also the meaning that “bear 
arms” had in the 18th century.  In numerous 
instances, “bear arms” was unambiguously used 
to refer to the carrying of weapons outside of an 
organized militia.  The most prominent exam-
ples are those most relevant to the Second 
Amendment: Nine state constitutional provi-
sions written in the 18th century or the first two 
decades of the 19th, which enshrined a right of 
citizens to “bear arms in defense of themselves and the state” or “bear arms in defense of 
himself and the state.”  It is clear from those formulations that “bear arms” did not refer 
only to carrying a weapon in an organized military unit. 
Meaning of the Operative Clause.  Putting all of these textual elements together, we 
find that they guarantee the individual right to possess and carry weapons in case of con-
frontation.  This meaning is strongly confirmed by the historical background of the Second 
Amendment.  ***  Between the Restoration and the Glorious Revolution, the Stuart Kings 
Charles II and James II succeeded in using select militias loyal to them to suppress political 
dissidents, in part by disarming their opponents.  These experiences caused Englishmen to 
be extremely wary of concentrated military forces run by the state and to be jealous of their 
arms. They accordingly obtained an assurance from William and Mary, in the Declaration 
of Right (which was codified as the English Bill of Rights), that Protestants would never be 
disarmed ***.  This right has long been understood to be the predecessor to our Second 
Amendment. 
By the time of the founding, the right to have arms had become fundamental for 
English subjects.  Blackstone [cited] the arms provision of the Bill of Rights as one of the 
fundamental rights of Englishmen, [describing it as] “the natural right of resistance and 
self-preservation” ***.  Thus, the right secured in 1689 as a result of the Stuarts’ abuses 
was by the time of the founding understood to be an individual right protecting against 
both public and private violence.  And, of course, what the Stuarts had tried to do to their 
political enemies, George III had tried to do to the colonists.  
There seems to us no doubt, on the basis of both text and history, that the Second 
Amendment conferred an individual right to keep and bear arms.  [We now determine] 
whether the prefatory clause of the Second Amendment comports with our interpretation 
of the operative clause.  ***  
Relationship between Prefatory Clause and Operative Clause
***  The debate with respect to the right to keep and bear arms, as with other guar-
antees in the Bill of Rights, was not over whether it was desirable (all agreed that it was) 
but over whether it needed to be codified in the Constitution.  During the 1788 ratification 
debates, the fear that the federal government would disarm the people in order to impose 
As the Court’s discussion makes 
clear, some state constitutions ex-
plicitly extended the right to bear 
arms to self-defense.  Does this fact 
support or undermine the Court’s 
interpretation?
Food for Thought
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rule through a standing army or select militia was pervasive in Antifederalist rhetoric. 
Federalists responded that because Congress was given no power to abridge the ancient 
right of individuals to keep and bear arms, such a force could never oppress the people. 
It was understood across the political spectrum that the right helped to secure the ideal 
of a citizen militia, which might be necessary to oppose an oppressive military force if the 
constitutional order broke down.
It is therefore entirely sensible that the Second Amendment’s prefatory clause 
announces the purpose for which the right was codified: to prevent elimination of the mili-
tia.  The prefatory clause does not suggest that preserving the militia was the only reason 
Americans valued the ancient right; most undoubtedly thought it even more important for 
self-defense and hunting.  But the threat that the new Federal Government would destroy 
the citizens’ militia by taking away their arms was the reason that right—unlike some other 
English rights—was codified in a written Constitution.  
[P]etitioners’ interpretation does not even achieve the narrower purpose that prompted 
codification of the right.  If, as they believe, the Second Amendment right is no more than 
the right to keep and use weapons as a member of an organized militia, [then] it does not 
assure the existence of a “citizens’ militia” as a safeguard against tyranny.  For Congress 
retains plenary authority to organize the militia, which must include the authority to say 
who will belong to the organized force.  ***  Thus, if petitioners are correct, the Second 
Amendment protects citizens’ right to use a gun 
in an organization from which Congress has 
plenary authority to exclude them.  It guaran-
tees a select militia of the sort the Stuart kings 
found useful, but not the people’s militia that 
was the concern of the founding generation.
Our interpretation is confirmed by analo-
gous arms-bearing rights in state constitutions 
that preceded and immediately followed adop-
tion of the Second Amendment.  Four States 
adopted analogues to the Federal Second 
Amendment in the period between indepen-
dence and the ratification of the Bill of Rights. 
Two of them—Pennsylvania and Vermont—
clearly adopted individual rights unconnected 
to militia service.  Pennsylvania’s Declaration 
of Rights of 1776 said: “That the people have a 
right to bear arms for the defence of themselves, and the state ***.”  In 1777, Vermont adopted 
the identical provision, except for inconsequential differences in punctuation and capital-
ization.  ***  North Carolina also codified a right to bear arms in 1776: “That the people 
have a right to bear arms, for the defence of the State ***.”  Declaration of Rights § XVII. 
This could plausibly be read to support only a right to bear arms in a militia—but that is 
a peculiar way to make the point in a constitution that elsewhere repeatedly mentions the 
militia explicitly.  We [believe] that the most likely reading of [these] pre-Second Amend-
ment state constitutional provisions is that they secured an individual right to bear arms 
Article I, § 8, cl. 16 gives Congress the 
power “[t]o provide for organizing, 
arming, and disciplining, the Militia, 
and for governing such Part of them 
as may be employed in the Service 
of the United States, reserving to the 
States respectively, the Appointment 
of the Officers, and the Authority of 
training the Militia according to the 
discipline prescribed by Congress.” 
Is it clear that this provision, especial-
ly when viewed in conjunction with 
cl. 15, authorizes Congress to deter-
mine the membership in the various 
state-controlled militias?
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for defensive purposes.  [That] is strong evidence that that is how the founding generation 
conceived of the right. 
Justice STEVENS places overwhelming reliance upon this Court’s decision in United 
States v. Miller, 307 U.S. 174 (1939).  [According to Justice STEVENS, Miller held that] 
the Second Amendment “protects the right to keep and bear arms for certain military 
purposes, but that it does not curtail the legislature’s power to regulate the nonmilitary use 
and ownership of weapons.”  [But] Miller did not hold that and cannot possibly be read to 
have held that.  The judgment in the case upheld against a Second Amendment challenge 
two men’s federal convictions for transporting an unregistered short-barreled shotgun in 
interstate commerce, in violation of the National Firearms Act, 48 Stat. 1236.  It is entirely 
clear that the Court’s basis for saying that the Second Amendment did not apply was [that] 
the type of weapon at issue was not eligible for Second Amendment protection: “In the 
absence of any evidence tending to show that the possession or use of a [short-barreled 
shotgun] at this time has some reasonable relationship to the preservation or efficiency of 
a well regulated militia, we cannot say that the Second Amendment guarantees the right 
to keep and bear such an instrument.”  307 U.S. at 178 (emphasis added).  “Certainly,” 
the Court continued, “it is not within judicial notice that this weapon is any part of the 
ordinary military equipment or that its use could contribute to the common defense.”  Ibid. 
[H]ad the Court believed that the Second Amendment protects only those serving in the 
militia, it would have been odd to examine the character of the weapon rather than simply 
note that the two crooks were not militiamen.  ***  We therefore read Miller to say only 
that the Second Amendment does not protect those weapons not typically possessed by 
law-abiding citizens for lawful purposes, such as short-barreled shotguns. 
Like most rights, the right secured by the Second Amendment is not unlimited.  *** 
Although we do not undertake an exhaustive historical analysis today of the full scope 
of the Second Amendment, nothing in our opinion should be taken to cast doubt on 
longstanding prohibitions on the possession of firearms by felons and the mentally ill, or 
laws forbidding the carrying of firearms in sensitive places such as schools and government 
buildings, or laws imposing conditions and qualifications on the commercial sale of arms. 
***  We also recognize another important limitation on the right to keep and carry arms. 
Miller said, as we have explained, that the sorts of weapons protected were those “in com-
mon use at the time.”  307 U.S. at 179.  We think that limitation is fairly supported by the 
historical tradition of prohibiting the carrying of “dangerous and unusual weapons.”  
We turn finally to the law at issue here.  [As we have demonstrated,] the inherent 
right of self-defense has been central to the Second Amendment right.  The handgun ban 
amounts to a prohibition of an entire class of “arms” that is overwhelmingly chosen by 
American society for that lawful purpose.  The prohibition extends, moreover, to the home, 
where the need for defense of self, family, and property is most acute.  Under any of the 
standards of scrutiny that we have applied to enumerated constitutional rights, banning 
from the home “the most preferred firearm in the nation to ‘keep’ and use for protection of 
one’s home and family,” 478 F.3d, at 400, would fail constitutional muster.  ***  Whatever 
the reason, handguns are the most popular weapon chosen by Americans for self-defense 
in the home, and a complete prohibition of their use is invalid.
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[T]he District’s requirement (as applied to respondent’s handgun) that firearms in the 
home be rendered and kept inoperable at all times [makes] it impossible for citizens to use 
them for the core lawful purpose of self-defense and is hence unconstitutional. 
Before this Court petitioners have stated that “if the handgun ban is struck down 
and respondent registers a handgun, he could obtain a license, assuming he is not other-
wise disqualified,” by which they apparently mean if he is not a felon and is not insane. 
Respondent conceded at oral argument that he does not “have a problem [with] licensing” 
and that the District’s law is permissible so long as it is “not enforced in an arbitrary and 
capricious manner.”  We therefore assume that petitioners’ issuance of a license will satisfy 
respondent’s prayer for relief and do not address the licensing requirement.
Justice BREYER [criticizes] us for declining to establish a level of scrutiny for evaluat-
ing Second Amendment restrictions.  He proposes, explicitly at least, none of the tradi-
tionally expressed levels (strict scrutiny, intermediate scrutiny, rational basis), but rather 
a judge-empowering “interest-balancing inquiry” that “asks whether the statute burdens a 
protected interest in a way or to an extent that is out of proportion to the statute’s salutary 
effects upon other important governmental interests.”  ***  We know of no other enu-
merated constitutional right whose core protection has been subjected to a freestanding 
“interest-balancing” approach. The very enumeration of the right takes out of the hands of 
government—even the Third Branch of Government—the power to decide on a case-by-
case basis whether the right is really worth insisting upon.  ***  Constitutional rights are 
enshrined with the scope they were understood to have when the people adopted them, 
whether or not future legislatures or (yes) even future judges think that scope too broad. 
[The Second Amendment] is the very product of an interest-balancing by the people—
which Justice BREYER would now conduct for them anew.  And whatever else it leaves 
to future evaluation, it surely elevates above all other interests the right of law-abiding, 
responsible citizens to use arms in defense of hearth and home.
In sum, we hold that the District’s ban on handgun possession in the home violates 
the Second Amendment, as does its prohibition against rendering any lawful firearm in 
the home operable for the purpose of immediate self-defense.  Assuming that Heller is not 
disqualified from the exercise of Second Amendment rights, the District must permit him 
to register his handgun and must issue him a license to carry it in the home.
We are aware of the problem of handgun violence in this country, and we take seri-
ously the concerns raised by the many amici who believe that prohibition of handgun 
ownership is a solution.  [But] the enshrinement of constitutional rights necessarily takes 
certain policy choices off the table.  These include the absolute prohibition of handguns 
held and used for self-defense in the home.  Undoubtedly some think that the Second 
Amendment is outmoded in a society where our standing army is the pride of our Nation, 
where well-trained police forces provide personal security, and where gun violence is a 
serious problem.  That is perhaps debatable, but what is not debatable is that it is not the 
role of this Court to pronounce the Second Amendment extinct.  [Affirmed.]
Justice STEVENS, with whom Justice SOUTER, Justice GINSBURG, and Justice 
BREYER join, dissenting.
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The Second Amendment was adopted to protect the right of the people of each of the 
several States to maintain a well-regulated militia.  It was a response to concerns raised 
during the ratification of the Constitution that the power of Congress to disarm the state 
militias and create a national standing army posed an intolerable threat to the sovereignty 
of the several States.  Neither the text of the Amendment nor the arguments advanced 
by its proponents evidenced the slightest interest in limiting any legislature’s authority 
to regulate private civilian uses of firearms.  Specifically, there is no indication that the 
Framers of the Amendment intended to enshrine the common-law right of self-defense in 
the Constitution.
In 1934, Congress enacted the National Firearms Act, the first major federal firearms 
law.  Upholding a conviction under that Act, this Court held that, “[i]n the absence of any 
evidence tending to show that possession or use of a ‘shotgun having a barrel of less than 
eighteen inches in length’ at this time has some reasonable relationship to the preserva-
tion or efficiency of a well regulated militia, we cannot say that the Second Amendment 
guarantees the right to keep and bear such an instrument.”  Miller, 307 U.S. at 178.  The 
view of the Amendment we took in Miller—that it protects the right to keep and bear arms 
for certain military purposes, but that it does not curtail the Legislature’s power to regulate 
the nonmilitary use and ownership of weapons—is both the most natural reading of the 
Amendment’s text and the interpretation most faithful to the history of its adoption.
***  The preamble to the Second Amendment [is] comparable to provisions in several 
State Declarations of Rights that were adopted roughly contemporaneously with the Decla-
ration of Independence.5  Those state provisions highlight the importance members of the 
founding generation attached to the maintenance of state militias; they also underscore the 
profound fear shared by many in that era of the dangers posed by standing armies.  While 
the need for state militias has not been a matter of significant public interest for almost 
two centuries, that fact should not obscure the contemporary concerns that animated the 
Framers.
The parallels between the Second Amendment and these state declarations, and the 
Second Amendment’s omission of any statement of purpose related to the right to use fire-
arms for hunting or personal self-defense, is especially striking in light of the fact that the 
Declarations of Rights of Pennsylvania and Vermont did expressly protect such civilian uses 
at the time.  Article XIII of Pennsylvania’s 1776 Declaration of Rights announced that “the 
people have a right to bear arms for the defence of themselves and the state”; § 43 of the Dec-
laration assured that “the inhabitants of this state shall have the liberty to fowl and hunt in 
seasonable times on the lands they hold, and on all other lands therein not inclosed.”  And 
Article XV of the 1777 Vermont Declaration of Rights guaranteed “[t]hat the people have a 
right to bear arms for the defence of themselves and the State.”  The contrast between those 
two declarations and the Second Amendment reinforces the clear statement of purpose 
5 The Virginia Declaration of Rights ¶ 13 (1776), provided: “That a well-regulated militia, composed of the body 
of the people, trained to arms, is the proper, natural, and safe defence of a free State; that Standing Armies, in 
time of peace, should be avoided, as dangerous to liberty; and that, in all cases, the military should be under 
strict subordination to, and governed by, the civil power.”  [Maryland, Delaware, and New Hampshire had similar 
provisions.]
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announced in the Amendment’s preamble.  It confirms that the Framers’ single-minded 
focus in crafting the constitutional guarantee “to keep and bear arms” was on military uses 
of firearms, which they viewed in the context of service in state militias.
The preamble thus both sets forth the object of the Amendment and informs the 
meaning of the remainder of its text.  ***  The Court today tries to denigrate the impor-
tance of this clause of the Amendment by beginning its analysis with the Amendment’s 
operative provision and returning to the preamble merely “to ensure that our reading of 
the operative clause is consistent with the announced purpose.”  That is not how this Court 
ordinarily reads such texts, and it is not how the preamble would have been viewed at the 
time the Amendment was adopted.  ***  Without identifying any language in the text that 
even mentions civilian uses of firearms, the Court proceeds to “find” its preferred reading 
in what is at best an ambiguous text, and then concludes that its reading is not foreclosed 
by the preamble.  Perhaps the Court’s approach to the text is acceptable advocacy, but it is 
surely an unusual approach for judges to follow.
[T]he words “the people” in the Second Amendment refer back to the object announced 
in the Amendment’s preamble.  They remind us that it is the collective action of individu-
als having a duty to serve in the militia that the text directly protects and, perhaps more 
importantly, that the ultimate purpose of the Amendment was to protect the States’ share 
of the divided sovereignty created by the Constitution.
Although the Court’s discussion of [the words “to keep and bear Arms”] treats them 
as two “phrases”—as if they read “to keep” and “to bear”—they describe a unitary right: to 
possess arms if needed for military purposes and to use them in conjunction with military 
activities.  ***  The term “bear arms” is a familiar idiom; when used unadorned by any 
additional words, its meaning is “to serve as a soldier, do military service, fight.”  1 Oxford 
English Dictionary 634 (2d ed.1989).  It is derived from the Latin arma ferre, which, trans-
lated literally, means “to bear [ferre] war equipment [arma].”  ***  Had the Framers wished 
to expand the meaning of the phrase “bear arms” to encompass civilian possession and use, 
they could have done so by the addition of phrases such as “for the defense of themselves,” 
as was done in the Pennsylvania and Vermont Declarations of Rights.  The unmodified use of 
“bear arms,” by contrast, refers most naturally to a military purpose, as evidenced by its use 
in literally dozens of contemporary texts.  ***  When, as in this case, there is no [qualifier], 
the most natural meaning is the military one; and, in the absence of any qualifier, it is all 
the more appropriate to look to the preamble to confirm the natural meaning of the text. 
The Amendment’s use of the term “keep” in no way contradicts the military meaning 
conveyed by the phrase “bear arms” and the Amendment’s preamble.  To the contrary, a 
number of state militia laws in effect at the time of the Second Amendment’s drafting used 
the term “keep” to describe the requirement that militia members store their arms at their 
homes, ready to be used for service when necessary.  The Virginia military law, for example, 
ordered that “every one of the said officers, non-commissioned officers, and privates, shall 
constantly keep the aforesaid arms, accoutrements, and ammunition, ready to be produced 
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whenever called for by his commanding officer.”  Act for Regulating and Disciplining the 
Militia, 1785 Va. Acts ch. 1, § 3, p. 2.  “[K]eep and bear arms” thus perfectly describes the 
responsibilities of a framing-era militia member.  
[T]he single right that [the clause describes] is both a duty and a right to have arms 
available and ready for military service, and to use them for military purposes when neces-
sary.  ***  When each word in the text is given full effect, the Amendment is most naturally 
read to secure to the people a right to use and possess arms in conjunction with service in 
a well-regulated militia.  
Two themes relevant to our current interpretive task ran through the debates on the 
original Constitution. “On the one hand, there was a widespread fear that a national stand-
ing Army posed an intolerable threat to individual liberty and to the sovereignty of the 
separate States.”  Perpich v. Department of Defense, 496 U.S. 334, 340 (1990).  On the other 
hand, the Framers recognized the dangers inherent in relying on inadequately trained mili-
tia members “as the primary means of providing for the common defense,”  Perpich, 496 
U.S. at 340.  ***  In order to respond to those twin concerns, a compromise was reached: 
Congress would be authorized to raise and support a national Army and Navy, and also to 
organize, arm, discipline, and provide for the calling forth of “the Militia.”  U.S. Const., Art. 
I, § 8, cls. 12-16.  The President, at the same time, was empowered as the “Commander 
in Chief of the Army and Navy of the United States, and of the Militia of the several States, 
when called into the actual Service of the United States.”  Art. II, § 2.  But, with respect 
to the militia, a significant reservation was made to the States: [the] States respectively 
would retain the right to appoint the officers and to train the militia in accordance with the 
discipline prescribed by Congress.  Art. I, § 8, cl. 16.20
But the original Constitution’s retention of the militia and its creation of divided 
authority over that body did not prove sufficient to allay fears about the dangers posed 
by a standing army [because] it did not prevent Congress from providing for the militia’s 
disarmament.  ***  This sentiment was echoed at a number of state ratification conven-
tions; indeed, it was one of the primary objections to the original Constitution voiced by 
its opponents.  
[In response, upon ratifying the Constitution several states proposed amendments to 
the document.]  The relevant proposals sent by the Virginia Ratifying Convention read as 
follows:
“17th, That the people have a right to keep and bear arms; that a well regulated Militia composed 
of the body of the people trained to arms is the proper, natural and safe defence of a free State.  
That standing armies are dangerous to liberty, and therefore ought to be avoided, as far as the 
circumstances and protection of the Community will admit; and that in all cases the military 
should be under strict subordination to and be governed by the civil power.”  
20 The Court assumes—incorrectly, in my view—that even when a state militia was not called into service, Con-
gress would have had the power to exclude individuals from enlistment in that state militia.  That assumption 
is not supported by the text of the Militia Clauses of the original Constitution, which confer upon Congress the 
power to “organiz[e], ar[m], and disciplin[e], the Militia,” Art. I, § 8, cl. 16, but not the power to say who will be 
members of a state militia.  It is also flatly inconsistent with the Second Amendment.  ***  
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“19th. That any person religiously scrupulous of bearing arms ought to be exempted, upon pay-
ment of an equivalent to employ another to bear 
arms in his stead.”  
North Carolina adopted Virginia’s propos-
als and sent them to Congress as its own 
***.   New York produced a proposal with 
nearly identical language.  Notably, each 
of these proposals used the phrase “keep 
and bear arms” [and] embedded the phrase 
within a group of principles that are dis-
tinctly military in meaning.
By contrast, New Hampshire’s proposal 
[described] the protection involved in more clearly personal terms[:] “Congress shall never 
disarm any Citizen unless such as are or have been in Actual Rebellion.”
[James] Madison, charged with the task of assembling the proposals for amendments 
sent by the ratifying States, was the principal draftsman of the Second Amendment.  [His] 
decision to model the Second Amendment on the distinctly military Virginia proposal is 
therefore revealing, since it is clear that he considered and rejected formulations that would 
have unambiguously protected civilian uses of firearms.  When [his draft proposal] was 
debated and modified, it is reasonable to assume that all participants in the drafting process 
were fully aware of the other formulations that would have protected civilian use and pos-
session of weapons and that their choice to craft the Amendment as they did represented a 
rejection of those alternative formulations.
Until today, it has been understood that legislatures may regulate the civilian use and 
misuse of firearms so long as they do not interfere with the preservation of a well-regulated 
militia.  The Court’s announcement of a new constitutional right to own and use firearms 
for private purposes upsets that settled understanding ***. 
Justice BREYER, with whom Justice STEVENS, Justice SOUTER, and Justice GINS-
BURG join, dissenting.
[T]he protection the [Second] Amendment provides is not absolute.  The Amendment 
permits government to regulate the interests that it serves.  Thus, irrespective of what those 
interests are—whether they do or do not include an independent interest in self-defense—
the majority’s view cannot be correct unless it can show that the District’s regulation is 
unreasonable or inappropriate in Second Amendment terms.  This the majority cannot do.
The majority is wrong when it says that the District’s law is unconstitutional “[u]nder 
any of the standards of scrutiny that we have applied to enumerated constitutional rights.” 
[It] certainly would not be unconstitutional under, for example, a “rational basis” standard, 
which requires a court to uphold regulation so long as it bears a “rational relationship” to 
a “legitimate governmental purpose.”  Heller v. Doe, 509 U.S. 312, 320 (1993).  The law at 
issue here, which in part seeks to prevent gun-related accidents, at least bears a “rational 
relationship” to that “legitimate” life-saving objective.  
Virginia’s proposal—and Madison’s 
original draft of the Second Amend-
ment—included a provision to ex-
empt conscientious objectors from 
service in the militias.  What does 
this provision suggest about the 
contexts in which the Amendment 
protects the right to keep and bear 
arms? 
Take Note
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Respondent proposes that the Court adopt a “strict scrutiny” test, which would require 
reviewing with care each gun law to determine whether it is “narrowly tailored to achieve 
a compelling governmental interest.”  Abrams v. Johnson, 521 U.S. 74, 82 (1997).  But the 
majority implicitly, and appropriately, rejects that suggestion by broadly approving a set 
of laws [whose] constitutionality under a strict scrutiny standard would be far from clear. 
Indeed, [almost] every gun-control regulation will seek to advance (as the one here does) 
a “primary concern of every government—a concern for the safety and indeed the lives of 
its citizens.”  United States v. Salerno, 481 U.S. 739, 755 (1987).  ***  Thus, any attempt 
in theory to apply strict scrutiny to gun regulations will in practice turn into an interest-
balancing inquiry, with the interests protected by the Second Amendment on one side and 
the governmental public-safety concerns on the other, the only question being whether the 
regulation at issue impermissibly burdens the former in the course of advancing the latter.
I would simply adopt such an interest-balancing inquiry explicitly.  *** 
“[W]here a law significantly implicates competing constitutionally protected interests in 
complex ways,” the Court generally asks whether the statute burdens a protected interest 
in a way or to an extent that is out of proportion to the statute’s salutary effects upon other 
important governmental interests.  See Nixon v. Shrink Missouri Government PAC, 528 U.S. 
377, 402 (2000) (BREYER, J., concurring).  Any answer would take account both of the 
statute’s effects upon the competing interests and the existence of any clearly superior less 
restrictive alternative. 
The only dispute regarding [the trigger-lock] provision appears to be whether the Con-
stitution requires an exception that would allow someone to render a firearm operational 
when necessary for self-defense ***.  The District concedes that such an exception exists. 
***  And because I see nothing in the District law that would preclude the existence of a 
background common-law self-defense exception, I would avoid the constitutional question 
by interpreting the statute to include it.  See Ashwander v. TVA, 297 U.S. 288, 348 (1936) 
(Brandeis, J., concurring).
No one doubts the constitutional importance of [the] basic objective [of the District’s 
ban on handgun possession], saving lives.  But there is considerable debate about whether 
the [provision] helps to achieve that objective.  ***  Petitioners, and their amici, have 
presented us with [statistics about handgun violence.]  ***  From 1993 to 1997, there were 
180,533 firearm-related deaths in the United States, an average of over 36,000 per year. 
***  In over one in every eight firearm-related deaths in 1997, the victim was someone 
under the age of 20.  ***  From 1993 to 1997, 81% of firearm-homicide victims were 
killed by handgun.  ***  Handguns also appear to be a very popular weapon among 
criminals.  ***  Statistics further suggest that urban areas, such as the District, have differ-
ent experiences with gun-related death, injury, and crime, than do less densely populated 
rural areas.  A disproportionate amount of violent and property crimes occur in urban 
areas, and urban criminals are more likely than other offenders to use a firearm during the 
commission of a violent crime. 
Respondent and his many amici [disagree] strongly with the District’s predictive judg-
ment that a ban on handguns will help solve the crime and accident problems that those 
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figures disclose.  ***  First, they point out that, since the ban took effect [in 1976], violent 
crime in the District has increased, not decreased.  ***  Second, respondent’s amici point to 
a statistical analysis that [concludes] that strict gun laws are correlated with more murders, 
not fewer.  ***  Third, they point to evidence indicating that firearm ownership does have a 
beneficial self-defense effect.  ***  Fourth, respondent’s amici argue that laws criminalizing 
gun possession are self-defeating, as evidence suggests that they will have the effect only of 
restricting law-abiding citizens, but not criminals, from acquiring guns.  
[T]he District and its amici [respond] with studies of their own.  ***  The 
upshot is a set of studies and counterstudies that, at most, could leave a judge 
uncertain about the proper policy conclusion.  [But] legislators, not judges, 
have primary responsibility for drawing policy conclusions from empirical fact. 
[D]eference to legislative judgment seems particularly appropriate here, where the judg-
ment has been made by a local legislature, with particular knowledge of local problems 
and insight into appropriate local solutions.  ***  For these reasons, I conclude that the 
District’s statute properly seeks to further the sort of life-preserving and public-safety inter-
ests that the Court has called “compelling.” 
The District’s statute burdens the Amendment’s first and primary objective hardly at 
all.  [T]here is general agreement among the Members of the Court that the principal (if 
not the only) purpose of the Second Amendment is found in the Amendment’s text: the 
preservation of a “well regulated Militia.”  ***  To begin with, the present case has nothing 
to do with actual military service.  [And] the District’s law does not seriously affect military 
training interests.  The law permits residents to engage in activities that will increase their 
familiarity with firearms.  They may register (and thus possess in their homes) weapons 
other than handguns, such as rifles and shotguns.  ***  And while the District law prevents 
citizens from training with handguns within the District, [the] adjacent States do permit the 
use of handguns for target practice, and those States are only a brief subway ride away. 
[G]iven the costs already associated with gun ownership and firearms training, I cannot 
say that a subway ticket and a short subway ride (and storage costs) create more than a 
minimal burden. 
The District’s law does prevent a resident from keeping a loaded handgun in his home. 
And it consequently makes it more difficult for the householder to use the handgun for 
self-defense in the home against intruders, such as burglars.  [But] there is no clearly 
superior, less restrictive alternative to the District’s handgun ban [because] the ban’s very 
objective is to reduce significantly the number of handguns in the District ***.  [A]ny 
measure less restrictive in respect to the use of handguns for self-defense will, to that same 
extent, prove less effective in preventing the use of handguns for illicit purposes.  If a 
resident has a handgun in the home that he can use for self-defense, then he has a handgun 
in the home that he can use to commit suicide or engage in acts of domestic violence.  *** 
[T]he District law is tailored to the life-threatening problems it attempts to address.  The 
law concerns one class of weapons, handguns, leaving residents free to possess shotguns 
and rifles, along with ammunition.  The area that falls within its scope is totally urban.  *** 
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The majority derides my approach as “judge-empowering.”  I take this criticism seri-
ously, but I do not think it accurate.  ***  Application of such an approach, of course, 
requires judgment, but the very nature of the approach—requiring careful identification of 
the relevant interests and evaluating the law’s effect upon them—limits the judge’s choices; 
and the method’s necessary transparency lays bare the judge’s reasoning for all to see and 
to criticize.
The majority’s methodology is, in my view, substantially less transparent than mine. 
***  “Putting all of [the Second Amendment’s] textual elements together,” the majority 
says, “we find that they guarantee the individual right to possess and carry weapons in 
case of confrontation.”  Then, three pages later, it says that “we do not read the Second 
Amendment to permit citizens to carry arms for any sort of confrontation.”  Yet, with one 
critical exception, it does not explain which confrontations count.  It simply leaves that 
question unanswered.
Nor is it at all clear to me how the majority decides which loaded “arms” a homeowner 
may keep.  The majority says that that Amendment protects those weapons “typically pos-
sessed by law-abiding citizens for lawful purposes.”  This definition conveniently excludes 
machineguns, but permits handguns, which the majority describes as “the most popular 
weapon chosen by Americans for self-defense in the home.”  But what sense does this 
approach make?  According to the majority’s reasoning, if Congress and the States lift 
restrictions on the possession and use of machineguns, and people buy machineguns to 
protect their homes, the Court will have to reverse course and find that the Second Amend-
ment does, in fact, protect the individual self-defense-related right to possess a machinegun. 
On the majority’s reasoning, if tomorrow someone invents a particularly useful, highly 
dangerous self-defense weapon, Congress and the States had better ban it immediately, for 
once it becomes popular Congress will no longer possess the constitutional authority to do 
so.  ***  There is no basis for believing that the Framers intended such circular reasoning.
I am similarly puzzled by the majority’s list [of] provisions that in its view would 
survive Second Amendment scrutiny.  ***  Why these?  Is it that similar restrictions existed 
in the late 18th century?  The majority fails to cite any colonial analogues.  ***  
The argument about method, however, is by far the less important argument surround-
ing today’s decision.  Far more important are the unfortunate consequences that today’s 
decision is likely to spawn.  Not least of these [is] the fact that the decision threatens to 
throw into doubt the constitutionality of gun laws throughout the United States.  I can find 
no sound legal basis for launching the courts on so formidable and potentially dangerous a 
mission.  In my view, there simply is no untouchable constitutional right guaranteed by the 
Second Amendment to keep loaded handguns in the house in crime-ridden urban areas.
_______________
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Points for Discussion
a. The Judicial Role and the Counter-Majoritarian Difficulty
In holding that the challenged regulations were unconstitutional, the Court noted that 
“the enshrinement of constitutional rights necessarily takes certain policy choices off the 
table.”  Notice that in making this statement, the Court is also asserting its authority both to 
determine the meaning of the Constitution and to invalidate democratically enacted laws. 
Is it problematic to permit the Court to act in such a counter-majoritarian, and arguably 
anti-democratic, fashion?  Or is it essential that the Court do so?  This question will be 
the subtext of all the material that follows, but it will be the particular focus of Chapter 2.
b. Structural and Institutional Arrangements or Individual Rights?
Justice Scalia concluded that the Second Amendment protects an individual right 
to keep and bear arms for purposes unrelated to participation in a state militia. Justice 
Stevens, by contrast, would have held that the Amendment is principally a structural pro-
tection to ensure that Congress cannot disarm the state militias.  Which view do you find 
more convincing?  
Notice that Justice Scalia did not deny the structural aims of the Second Amendment, 
and that Justice Stevens did deny that its structural aims advance the interest in liberty. 
The first several Parts of this book will focus on the principal structural and institutional 
arrangements that the Constitution creates, federalism and separation of powers.  As we 
will see in detail, the Framers clearly viewed these arrangements as essential to preserving 
individual liberty.  The remainder of the book will focus on the Constitution’s explicit and 
direct protections for individual rights.  Does it make sense to treat structural provisions 
and rights provisions as separate and discrete features of the constitutional scheme?
c. Interpretive Methodology: Originalism v. Non-Originalism
In interpreting the Second Amendment, Justice Scalia sought to determine its meaning 
at the time of the Framing.  He relied on contemporaneous sources, such as eighteenth-
century dictionaries and state constitutional provisions.  Justice Breyer focused on the 
competing state and individual interests implicated by the challenged regulation.  Was 
his approach non-originalist?  Or did he simply seek to apply the original meaning of 
the Second Amendment to modern circumstances?  Which approach did you find more 
sensible or convincing?
d. Interpretive Methodology: Originalism v. Originalism
Like Justice Scalia, Justice Stevens took an originalist approach to the Second Amend-
ment, but he reached a very different conclusion about the Amendment’s meaning. To the 
extent that the two Justices relied on similar materials, whose arguments did you find more 
convincing?  What does the fact that they relied in part on competing sources say about the 
viability of originalism as an approach to interpreting the Constitution?
Did their inquiries have the same objective?  Notice that Justice Scalia focused prin-
cipally on what the language of the Second Amendment likely would have meant at the 
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time of its ratification. Justice Stevens spent considerable time addressing the Amendment’s 
drafting history.  Does that mean that Justice Stevens was attempting to discern Madi-
son’s—and the other Framers’—intent in ratifying the Amendment?  Is there a difference 
between the original “objective meaning” and the original “intent”?  Is there a difference in 
the evidence that one might use to establish meaning and intent?
Notice also that Justice Scalia read the individual phrases in the Second Amendment 
atomistically, asking what each phrase means before assembling those individual meanings 
into one, broader meaning.  Justice Stevens, by contrast, read the Amendment more holisti-
cally, with a particular emphasis on what the preamble suggests about the meaning of what 
Justice Scalia referred to as the “operative” clause.  Given that many of the Constitution’s 
most important provisions are written at a high level of generality and often are ambigu-
ous in their application, what is the role of text in constitutional interpretation?  Whose 
approach in Heller to the text did you find most convincing?
e. Level of Scrutiny
As the competing opinions suggested, the Court often assesses the constitutionality of 
government action by evaluating the governmental interests advanced by the action and 
the burden that the action imposes on the constitutional right at issue.  For example, the 
Court has never interpreted the Equal Protection Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment 
absolutely to prohibit the government from treating different classes of citizens differ-
ently.  Some classifications—such as a law providing that only persons over sixteen years 
of age are eligible to obtain driver’s licenses—do not seem problematic, and accordingly 
are subjected only to “rational basis review,” under which they are upheld as long as the 
classification is reasonably related to some legitimate governmental interest.  Other clas-
sifications—such as laws that deny government benefits on the basis of race—are deeply 
suspect, and accordingly are subjected to “strict 
scrutiny,” under which they can be upheld only 
if they are narrowly tailored to achieve a com-
pelling governmental interest.   Still other classi-
fications—such as those that distinguish on the 
basis of gender—are subjected to “intermediate 
scrutiny,” which falls somewhere between ratio-
nal basis review and strict scrutiny. The various 
levels of scrutiny generally reflect a judgment 
that few constitutional prohibitions are absolute, and that some government actions that 
burden protected rights nevertheless are defensible.
What level of scrutiny did the majority apply to the challenged regulations?  Did the 
majority consider the government’s interest in the challenged regulations?  Or did the 
majority simply suggest that regulations that would have been prohibited in 1791 are 
prohibited today?  Does the majority’s suggestion that many regulations of the right to bear 
arms would be constitutional shed any light on this question?  What level of scrutiny did 
Justice Stevens apply?  
We discuss levels of scrutiny in 
Chapter 10, and in Chapters 8, 11, 
12, and 14 we consider their appli-
cation in detail.
Make the Connection
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Justice Breyer explicitly proposed a test under which the challenged regulation’s con-
stitutionality turns on whether the statute “burdens a protected interest in a way or to 
an extent that is out of proportion to the statute’s salutary effects upon other important 
governmental interests.”  Is this approach preferable to the majority’s apparent approach 
of recognizing categories of absolutely forbidden regulations and of clearly permissible 
regulations?
f. Role of Precedent
Before Heller, the Court had decided very few cases that even circumspectly inter-
preted the Second Amendment.  Perhaps the most important was United States v. Miller, 307 
U.S. 174 (1939), a brief opinion whose reasoning, as the competing approaches in Heller 
show, was far from clear.  What is the role of precedent in interpreting the Constitution? 
Suppose that the Court in Miller had clearly held that the Second Amendment protects 
the right to keep and bear arms only in conjunction with participation in a state militia. 
Would the Court in Heller have been bound by that holding if it concluded that the Court 
in Miller had failed properly to discern the original meaning of the Amendment?  When is it 
appropriate for the Court to overrule prior decisions that interpreted the Constitution?  In 
answering this question, consider what remedies exist when the Court “errs” in interpret-
ing the Constitution.
g. The Constitution and Ambiguity
The issue in Heller was both of great importance and seemingly fundamental.  Why do 
you think it took the Court over 200 years squarely to resolve that issue?  In fact, as we will 
see throughout this book, a surprising number of important constitutional questions have 
never been addressed by the Court.  As you read the materials that follow, consider why, 
and whether constitutional ambiguity is a good or bad thing.
h. Role of the Dissenting Opinions
Why did Justices Breyer and Stevens write such extensive dissenting opinions?  Dis-
senting opinions do not carry any precedential value, as they represent the views of a 
minority of Justices.  Are dissenting opinions simply an expression of disagreement for 
disagreement’s sake?  Are they templates for criticism of the Court’s decision?  If so, to 
what end?  Are they in effect intended as the 
groundwork for a future change of course on 
the Court?  In this book, we will regularly see 
dissenting opinions.  If nothing else, does the 
Court’s frequent inability to achieve unanimity 
suggest anything about the nature of constitu-
tional interpretation?
_______________
Test your knowledge with online 
quizzes. 
Does Heller represent originalism’s triumph or its failure? 
Point:  GreGory e. MaGGs
“Originalism” is a doctrine saying that judges should interpret the Constitution accord-
ing to its original meaning.  Proponents of originalism disagree on some points, such as 
whether judges should focus on the original intent of the Framers, the original understand-
ing of the ratifiers, or the original objective meaning of the Constitution’s text.  But they 
all agree that none of these meanings change over time and that judges should not allow 
current policy considerations to affect their interpretation of the Constitution.
One common objection to originalism is that it does not produce certain results.  The 
argument supporting this objection is that the text of the Constitution and the relevant 
historical materials are often too sparse or inconclusive to produce definitive answers 
to current constitutional issues.  This deficiency may prevent judges from determining 
answers to important constitutional questions.  Worse, it may allow judges to decide cases 
according to their own political preferences and then cover up what they are doing with 
make-weight arguments resting on vague historical documents.
At first glance, the Supreme Court’s decision in District of Columbia v. Heller, 554 U.S. 
570 (2008), might appear to support this objection to originalism.  Justice Scalia’s opinion 
for the Court and Justice Stevens’s dissenting opinion both claim to use originalist method-
ology, but they reach different conclusions.  This result may suggest to some that original-
ism cannot answer the question of what the Second Amendment means.  In addition, the 
Court’s conservatives concluded that the gun control law at issue was unconstitutional, 
while the Court’s liberals concluded that it was not.  Because conservative politicians tend 
to oppose gun control, and liberal politicians tend to favor it, this division of the Justices 
might suggest that politics determined the Justices’ positions.
But further reflection should reveal that Heller does not represent a failure of original-
ism.  Any method of constitutional interpretation may produce differing conclusions.  But 
originalism appears to be generally more determinate than other interpretative methods. 
Most of the cases in this book contain both majority and dissenting opinions, yet in very 
few of these cases did both sides attempt to use originalist methodology.  Heller is an 
example, as is U.S. Term Limits v. Thornton, 514 U.S. 779 (1995), but not many others come 
to mind.   Has any other method of constitutional interpretation produced comparable 
certainty?
As for policy preferences, a closer look casts doubt on suspicions that either the major-
ity or the dissent in Heller was just voting for the outcome that it favored as a matter of 
policy.  The District of Columbia statute was among the most extreme gun control laws in 
the nation.  Even without knowing what the individual Justices actually think about gun 
PoInT-counTerPoInT
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control, it is difficult to believe that all of the members of the dissent, who generally favor 
personal rights, would want laws that effectively ban all handgun ownership.  The majority 
meanwhile went out of its way to make clear, in dicta, that many kinds of gun regulations 
are still constitutional.  Again, it is hard to imagine that all of the Justices in the majority 
would favor every possible regulation.  Instead, Heller appears to represent a good faith 
effort to determine what the Second Amendment originally meant, and is thus a triumph 
of originalism.
_______________
counterPoint: Peter J. sMith
Originalism’s proponents contend that it is the only legitimate approach to constitu-
tional interpretation because (they say) it is the only approach that accords to the Constitu-
tion an objectively identifiable fixed meaning and, in so doing, prevents the Justices from 
imposing their personal policy preferences under the guise of constitutional interpretation. 
Yet the dueling opinions in Heller demonstrate why originalism fails to live up to its prom-
ise.
The 27 words of the Second Amendment provoked over 100 pages of interpretive 
analysis, and led two incredibly intelligent, historically well-versed, and widely respected 
Justices to diametrically different interpretations.  And this should not be surprising.  Most 
constitutional provisions are written at a very high level of generality—such as “Equal 
Protection” or “Due Process”—that give few hints about their “original” meaning as applied 
to concrete circumstances.  And even those—such as the Second Amendment—that seem 
to speak at a higher level of specificity often are susceptible to multiple (and irreconcilable) 
interpretations.  (The language of the Amendment, with its prefatory and operative clauses, 
is particularly obscure.)  Add to these textual ambiguities the historical ambiguities that 
originalism invites—Would a “reasonable person” in 1791 have understood the first half 
of the Second Amendment to qualify the second half?  Even assuming we can find enough 
evidence of such understanding, what if reasonable people in 1791 (like reasonable people 
today) disagreed about the meaning of the Amendment?—and originalism rarely produces 
meaning any more determinate than any other approach to constitutional interpretation.  
If originalism is unlikely (at least in difficult cases, which, after all, are the only ones 
that end up seeing the light of day in a courtroom) to produce determinate meaning, then 
originalists’ claims about how it constrains judges begin to fall apart.  A judge seeking the 
original meaning of the Second Amendment can focus either on early militia provisions in 
state Declarations of Rights (as did Justice Stevens) or instead on the even-earlier English 
Bill of Rights or the writings of Blackstone (as did Justice Scalia); on contemporaneous dic-
tionary definitions (as did Justice Scalia) or instead on contemporaneous state militia laws 
that used similar words (as did Justice Stevens).  A judge can read early state constitutional 
provisions referring explicitly to the right to bear arms for self-defense either to confirm 
(as did Justice Scalia) or to refute (as did Justice Stevens) the view that the Second Amend-
ment similarly protects such a right.  And although there is no obvious reason to doubt 
the sincerity with which the Justices approached the question, one cannot ignore that the 
Justices widely viewed as the most conservative sided with the view preferred by political 
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conservatives and that the more liberal Justices sided with the view preferred by political 
liberals.  Originalism, it seems, is not nearly as constraining as its proponents claim. 
Legal scholars have long debated the original meaning of the Second Amendment.  But 
historians recognize that any such question is not susceptible to one authoritative answer; 
the Constitution, after all, was ratified by collective decision-making (in each state, no less), 
which reflected a dizzying array of (often dueling) intentions, expectations, hopes, and 
fears.  One can debate whether the majority or the dissent had the better of the arguments. 
But it is time that we stopped pretending that this particular approach to constitutional 
interpretation is any better than others at establishing rules for judges to do what they 
must: to exercise judgment. 
